



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL: MOTIVATIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION**

by

Eric J. Gust

March 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Anne M. Baylouny
Abbas K. Kadhim

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 2008	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Arab Citizens of Israel: Motivations for Collective Action			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Eric J. Gust				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>Israeli Arabs are torn between their Palestinian identity and their Israeli citizenship. Discrimination against Arabs is evident in numerous aspects of Israeli society such as the declaration of the country as a Jewish state, unequal state funding of Arab and Jewish programs, and the expropriation of Arab lands. Most studies of collective action and social mobilization would predict that repressed groups eventually mobilize if inclusion in the political process is denied. This has not been the case among Israeli Arabs because they are allowed to vote, but there are still many rights that are reserved for the Jewish majority. Discriminatory policies against Israeli Arabs may serve as short term solutions for the Jewish majority, but they will also create long term problems for the state.</p> <p>This research uses social movement theory to analyze the situation of Israeli Arabs in order to determine the probability for their collective action against the state. The conclusion states that, among Arab citizens, a regional Palestinian identity is beginning to overshadow the Israeli identity. A new generation of educated and disgruntled Israeli Arabs is rising up to take ownership of the new identity which could lead to future collective action against the state.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Israeli Arabs, Palestinian citizens of Israel, social movement theory, Arab minority in Israel, intifada, collective action, mobilizing structures, frames, political opportunity			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 79	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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**THE ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL: MOTIVATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION**

Eric J. Gust
Captain, United States Army
U.S. Military Academy, U.S., 2002

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2008**

Author: Eric J. Gust

Approved by: Anne M. Baylouny
Thesis Advisor

Abbas K. Kadhim
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Israeli Arabs are torn between their Palestinian identity and their Israeli citizenship. Discrimination against Arabs is evident in numerous aspects of Israeli society such as the declaration of the country as a Jewish state, unequal state funding of Arab and Jewish programs, and the expropriation of Arab lands. Most studies of collective action and social mobilization predict that repressed groups will eventually mobilize if inclusion in the political process is denied. This has not been the case among Israeli Arabs because they are allowed to vote, but there are still many rights that are reserved for the Jewish majority. Discriminatory policies against Israeli Arabs may serve as short term solutions for the Jewish majority, but they will also create long term problems for the state.

This research will use social movement theory to analyze the situation of Israeli Arabs in order to determine the probability for their collective action against the state. The conclusion states that, among Arab citizens, a regional Palestinian identity is beginning to overshadow the Israeli identity. A new generation of educated and disgruntled Israeli Arabs is rising up to take ownership of the new identity which could lead to future collective action against the state.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Anne M. Baylouny and Professor Abbas K. Kadhim for their guidance and knowledge, not only during the writing of my thesis, but in several classes along the way. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the faculty of the NSA Department. I have gained a well-rounded understanding of the Middle East and Islam due to their expertise and instruction.

Last, but certainly not least, I am eternally grateful to my wife, Leigh, and my two children, Meg and Liam, for their love, support, and patience throughout this endeavor.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has dominated international headlines since the founding of Israel in 1948. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel gained possession of the West Bank and Gaza Strip along with all the Palestinian Arabs living on the land. For the past forty years, the Palestinians in the occupied territories have displayed unity and dedication in their fight against Israel. Throughout the violence and bloodshed, there has always been one vital group that remains relatively silent within Israel's borders. They are the Palestinians who refused to leave their land in 1948 and became citizens of the new state. Israeli Arabs are torn between their Palestinian identity and their Israeli citizenship. Azmi Bishara, a former Arab member of the Israeli Knesset, adequately explained the complex nature of Israeli Arab citizenship:

We got citizenship in order to stay on our land in 1948 after most of our people were driven out into exile. The people who stayed here did not immigrate here, this is our country. That is why you cannot deal with us on issues of loyalty. This state came here and was enforced on the ruins of my nation. I accepted citizenship to be able to live here, and I will not do anything, security-wise, against the state. I am not going to conspire against the state, but you cannot ask me every day if I am loyal to the state. Citizenship demands from me to be loyal to the law, but not to the values or ideologies of the state. It is enough to be loyal to the law.¹

Many Israeli Arabs simply do not want to “rock the boat,” as they only make up about twenty percent of Israel's population, but the Jewish majority also plays a role in keeping the Arabs politically ineffective.² Most studies of collective action and social mobilization would predict that repressed groups eventually mobilize if inclusion in the political process is denied. This has not been the case among Israeli Arabs because they are allowed to vote, but there are still many rights that are reserved for the Jewish majority. This discrimination is evident in numerous aspects of Israeli society such as the

¹ Suzanne Goldenberg, “Hated and Feted,” *The Guardian* (London), March 23, 2002, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed on 11 October 2007).

² Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 87.

declaration of the country as a Jewish state, “unequal funding of local [Arab] councils, education, and development projects,” and expropriation of Arab lands.³

Israeli Arabs are suffering from an identity dilemma, but the state is also trying to maintain its historical Jewish identity, which explains many of the biased practices mentioned above. Kimmerling wrote that “after the establishment of the new state of Israel, the Arabs who remained were considered a hostile minority, a kind of Trojan horse, a potential danger to the fundamental security of the nation.”⁴ These fears were justifiable given the circumstances of the 1948 war and the several Israeli-Arab wars that followed, but the Arab minority in Israel has continuously showed its loyalty to the democratic state. Unfortunately, their loyalty is met with continued suspicion and distrust. Aside from security issues, the Jewish majority also views the Arabs as a demographic threat. The Israeli Arab birthrate is much higher than that of the Jewish population and the government fears an eventual loss of the Jewish majority status. While this observation is based more on speculation than reality, it still strikes a nerve with many Israeli Jews. “Perhaps the issue is a carryover from the British mandate period when the numbers of Jews entering Palestine were restricted. Added to this is the devastating demographic impact of the European Holocaust on the Jewish population of Europe.”⁵ The Jews have a historical awareness of their population size along with any threats that might endanger it. The discriminatory policies against Israeli Arabs may serve as short term solutions for the Jewish majority, but they will also create long term problems for the state. While Palestinians in the diaspora and the occupied territories have grievances against Israel, the legitimacy of the protests of these groups would increase with the consistent inclusion of Israeli Arabs. Among the three Palestinian groups, the Israeli Arabs seem to be in the best position to protest Israel’s government

³ Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel, Vol. 2: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 157.

⁴ Baruch Kimmerling, *The Invention and Decline of Israeliness* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 96.

⁵ Calvin Goldscheider, *Cultures in Conflict: The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 70.

and represent the other two groups in a non-violent manner. On the other hand, they also have the most to lose among the three groups if they take part in collective action against the Israeli government.

Is there a tipping point in discrimination for Arab citizens of Israel, causing them to relate theirs to the plight of Palestinian groups outside of Israel and disassociate themselves from their Israeli identities? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question by first examining the unequal practices of the Israeli government toward its Israeli Arab population. I then use social movement theory (SMT) to analyze the actions of Israeli Arabs during the second intifada and the causes for increased but still limited political mobilization and assertion of their Arab identity. Finally, I address events between 2000 and 2007 that further alienated the Arab minority and made them a captive audience for social movement organizations. SMT serves as the structural framework for the argument throughout the paper. I conclude that Israeli Arabs are in the process of embracing a new identity that has emerged from Palestinian nationalism. The consistent discrimination by the Jewish majority serves as a constant reminder of the Arab need for an identity that is separate from the Jewish state. A new generation of educated and disgruntled Arabs is rising up to take ownership of the new identity. Their proper use of mobilizing structures and frames within Arab society could open the door for more political opportunities or start another intifada that is capable of sustained collective action.

A. LITERATURE REVIEW

It is an accepted reality among scholars that Arab citizens of Israel do not enjoy all the benefits of citizenship as their Jewish peers. Arabs only represent around twenty percent of Israel's population and the Jewish majority consistently implements policies in order to maintain the status quo. The difference in opinion stems from whether or not the Israeli Arabs have the potential to collectively mobilize against the state. The predominant argument claims they do not because the Israeli government maintains Jewish dominance in society through the seizure of Arab lands, "institutionalized

segregation,” and other discriminatory practices.⁶ This argument tends to characterize the Arabs as a powerless minority that is unwilling to mobilize due to their relatively higher standard of living compared to Arabs in other Middle East countries, state co-optation, and a lack of organizational structures within Arab civil society.⁷ This viewpoint is argued by many scholars such as Ian Lustick, Baruch Kimmerling, and Joel Migdal, but it is becoming outdated.

The contrasting argument, championed by Magid Shihade, Dan Rabinowitz and Khawla Abu-Baker, and Laurence Louer states that the Israeli Arab population is far from helpless and that there is an “emergence among the Palestinian citizens of Israel of a new sociological generation that [Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker] label the Stand-Tall Generation.”⁸ The Arab minority is becoming more capable of collective action as they lose hope in gaining equality through the political process. Regardless of which argument is correct, both groups provide important insight on the factors that might lead to Israeli Arab collective action against the state of Israel.

In their book, *Palestinians: The Making of a People*, Migdal and Kimmerling stress that the Arab citizens of Israel lack the necessary organization to rise up against the Jewish state. In turn, “the central task of national reconstruction has fallen to those remaining outside Israel – both in Arab Palestine and in the new Palestinian communities beyond the borders of the old British mandate.”⁹ The authors stress that even when Palestinians inside Israel united in a common cause with their brethren in the occupied territories during the first intifada, there was a lack of organization within the uprising. “When the rioting broke out, Israeli civil administrators turned to the village mukhtars and the old notable leadership, who, to the astonishment of the Israelis...could do little to stem the tide of resistance. It had become uncertain precisely where authority within

⁶ Oren Yiftachel, “Democracy or Ethnocracy?: Territory and Settler Politics in Israel/Palestine” in *Middle East Report*, No. 207, (Summer 1998), 11.

⁷ Lustick, 129

⁸ Dan Rabinowitz and Khawla Abu-Baker, *Coffins on Our Shoulders: The Experience of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 2.

⁹ Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People*, NY: The Free Press, 1993), 184.

Palestinian society lay.”¹⁰ Migdal and Kimmerling also address how the Israeli Arabs, once seen as a possible “revolutionary force” for the Palestinian cause, became relatively content with their situation in comparison to the Palestinians outside of Israel.¹¹ “Israel’s Arabs found themselves with better economic and cultural conditions, higher morale, and more political freedom. Few of them seemed ready to trade their positions in the Jewish state for the lot of their brothers.”¹² The reluctance to give up their comparatively better positions had a direct effect on the Israeli Arabs participation in the intifadas. Providing full support for the Palestinian cause came with greater risks than perceived benefits, so they stood on the sidelines for the majority of the uprising. “Even at the tensest moment in the midst of a clash with police during the general strike in December, 1987, [Israeli-Arabs] were careful to draw a firm boundary between support for the intifada – consisting for the most part of raising money for its Arab victims – and their own participation in it.”¹³

Adding to the argument, Lustick claims that “the failure of Israel’s Arab minority to ‘organize itself’ and the minimal significance, to date, of the communal segmentation of Israeli society for the operation and stability of the Israeli political system are due to the presence of a highly effective system of control which, since 1948, has operated over Israeli Arabs.”¹⁴ His book then goes on to describe each way that the Israeli government controls the Arab minority. The position posed by Migdal, Kimmerling, and Lustick is the most accepted and widely publicized view used to explain the lack of mobilization among Israeli Arabs. However, the opposing viewpoint is becoming more applicable to the current state of affairs in Israel.

In his article, “Internal Violence: State’s Role and Society’s Responses,” Shihade argues that strong Palestinian social structures do exist and they have been successful in protesting against the Israeli government and policing internal conflicts. Shihade directly counters the arguments of Lustick, Migdal, and Kimmerling and refers to them as “an

¹⁰ Kimmerling and Migdal, 274.

¹¹ Ibid., 180.

¹² Ibid., 181.

¹³ Ibid., 181-182.

¹⁴ Lustick, 25.

inaccurate picture and a simplistic explanation of the relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinian Arab citizens.”¹⁵ The majority of his argument concerning Israeli Arabs and the Israeli state is summed up in the following quote:

If the Palestinian Arab community was, in fact, weak (traditional, tribal, vulnerable to co-optation and intimidation or corrupt), as [Lustick, Migdal, and Kimmerling] suggest, then we would have seen greater success in the Israeli state policy of divide and rule, and in the intended alienation and division of Arab Palestinian citizens. In other words, the state would have by now succeeded in creating communal wars between different Arab religious groups; but this is not the case.¹⁶

Shihade is fully aware that Israel discriminates against its Arab citizens, but he stresses that Palestinian Arab Israelis are not helpless and should not be treated in such a fashion. His argument that the state has failed to create communal wars between Arab groups is valid, but he fails to mention that the state consistently represses the Arab minority with few repercussions. Israeli Arabs may not be helpless, but they have been unable to realistically challenge the status quo in Israel. More recent events may point toward a new trend.

In her book, *To be an Arab in Israel*, Louer stresses the difficulties faced by Israeli Arabs in the Jewish state. Published in 2007, her book addresses some of the most recent trends leading toward Arab collective action in Israel. According to Louer, much of the dissent among the Arab population currently stems from limited inclusion in the political process. Noteworthy events to support her argument were the Israeli Arab election boycott in 2001 and the fifty-six percent electoral participation rate in 2006.¹⁷ Louer concludes that “the most serious threat [posed by Israeli Arabs] may be yet to come [...and] it would be the result of the failure of the Israeli political establishment, and especially Labour, to bring to fulfillment its partnership with the Arabs.”¹⁸ Louer focuses on the importance of a collective identity among the Arab minority and she

¹⁵ Magid Shihade, “Internal Violence: State’s Role and Society’s Responses,” *Arabs Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 4, (Fall 2005), 37.

¹⁶ Ibid., 37-38.

¹⁷ Laurence Louer, *To Be an Arab in Israel* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 203.

¹⁸ Ibid.

believes sufficient progress has been made over the past few years. While most scholars argue that the Jewish majority continues to effectively fractionalize the Arab minority both politically and demographically, Louer believes that Israeli Arabs are emerging as a major and necessary force in Israeli society. Furthermore, even though Israeli Arabs have never truly unified their twenty percent of electoral votes in the political arena, they are still unified in other ways. “In spite of the competition in which they engage, the Arab parties operate as true community institutions, acting in coordination, all of them in the last resort maintaining the consensus around Palestinian identity.”¹⁹

Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker describe a new awareness that began to rise within Israeli Arab society after the start of the second intifada in October 2000. In their book, *Coffins on Our Shoulders*, they stress that Palestinian nationalism began to spread throughout West Bank and Gaza when Israel took steps at Madrid to “recognize the legitimacy of Palestinian national aspirations and the PLO as its representative organ.”²⁰ Although the PLO was not the representative body of the Palestinians in Israel, the sense of Palestinian pride and nationalism still resonated with them. “Their sense of national belonging could now cross geographic, class, and religious lines to form a solid anchor for their newly asserted identity.”²¹ This assessment supports the concept of a new social movement among Israel’s Arab population that could possibly emerge in the near future.

B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Social movement theory (SMT) is a basic structural framework used to explain the many factors that lead to social mobilization and the case of Israel’s Arab population is a prime example. SMT is a large field of study and an abundance of competing arguments have been published regarding the degree of importance that should be given to each aspect of the theory. When large scale social movements began to emerge in the eighteenth century, “theorists focused on the three facets of movements that they feared

¹⁹ Louer, 94.

²⁰ Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 114.

²¹ Ibid.

the most: extremism, deprivation, and violence.”²² As time progressed, there was a “civilizing process” within social movements and new characteristics of mobilization emerged.²³ Tarrow describes the new characteristics as “collective challenge, common purpose, social solidarity, and sustained interaction.”²⁴ Similarly, Tilly lists “interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself” as the main components of collective action.²⁵ SMT scholars generally agree on the necessary factors for social mobilization, but their opinions vary on which factors are the most important. For example, Tarrow and McAdam lean toward political opportunity as the key component of mobilization while Kurzman stresses the necessity of mobilizing structures or “organizational resources - physical, financial, and human – [that easily transfer] to social movement activities.”²⁶ There are also contrasting arguments concerning who is most likely to participate in collective action. Passy and Giugni argue that social networks are highly significant for the likelihood of individual participation²⁷ but Finkel and Opp counter that incentives within political parties are the major driving factor.²⁸ Additionally, McAdam and Paulsen focus on the importance of individual identification with the social movement organization in order to move from a supporter to an activist.²⁹ The scholars mentioned above have used case studies such as political participation in Germany³⁰ and the U.S. Civil Rights movement³¹ to explain the dominance or validity of one aspect of SMT over another. Few, if any, of the case

²² Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4.

²³ Tarrow, 4.

²⁴ Ibid., 5.

²⁵ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 7.

²⁶ Charles Kurzman, “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movements,” *Mobilization: An International Journal* 3, no. 1 (1998), 27.

²⁷ Florence Passy and Marco Giugni, “Social Networks and Individual Perceptions: Explaining Differential Participation in Social Movements,” *Sociological Forum* 16, no. 1 (March 2001), 123-153.

²⁸ Steven E. Finkel and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Party Identification and Participation in Collective Political Action,” *The Journal of Politics* 53, no. 2 (May 1991), 366.

²⁹ Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 99, no. 3 (November 1993), 663.

³⁰ Steven Finkel and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Party Identification and Participation in Collective Political Action,” *The Journal of Politics* 53, no. 2 (May 1991), 339-371.

³¹ Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 99, no. 3 (November 1993), 640-667.

studies have truly represented a “perfect storm” or the definitive example of all factors of SMT coming together with equal importance in order to achieve social mobilization. The current situation in Israel is an example of an emerging social movement that is equally dependent on mobilizing structures, opportunities, and frames in order to succeed.

For the purpose of analyzing Israeli Arab society, this paper will focus on the three main characteristics of SMT: mobilizing structures, political opportunities, and framing processes. The unique aspect within the state of Israel is the lack of compromise displayed by the majority of the Jewish population which creates an all or nothing rationale between security and equal rights for the Arab minority. The declaration of Israel as a Jewish state is not historically due to racism against Arabs, but Jewish attempts to maintain the title within a modern democratic framework are clearly biased. Regardless of this observation, the Israeli government and the Jewish majority have displayed their dedication to the security of Israel on several occasions, most of which were through military force. Maintaining the Jewish nature of Israel is arguably at the same level of importance or at least in the same category as the military defense of its borders. The thought of assimilation with the Arab population and possible loss of majority status in Israel is seen as a catastrophic security threat by the Jewish majority.³² Most social movements face opposition from the state due to a threat posed to the status quo. In contrast, Israeli Arabs face a more determined opposition because, in addition to maintaining the status quo, the Jewish majority fears the loss of its own identity *and survival* at the expense of Arab equal rights. Compromise has become a form of weakness in the political realm and government officials risk political suicide for even considering negotiations with enemies of the state. Accordingly, the attempt to stress the importance of one factor of SMT over another is pointless because, as this paper will argue, all three factors are equally necessary for a social movement to occur in the uncompromising state of Israel.

³² David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), 136.

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II. DISCRIMINATION IN ISRAEL

The majority of the discrimination against Israeli Arabs stems from the declaration of Israel as a “Jewish State” and the attempts by the government to maintain the demographic dominance of the Jewish population. In this context, advancement of Arabs within Israeli society, whether in the demographic, economic, political, or educational sectors, is viewed as occurring at the expense of the Jewish population and could be perceived as a threat to the Jewish nature of Israel. Additionally, the annual celebration of Israel’s proclamation of statehood on May 14, 1948, is a glorious time for the Jewish majority, but it also represents the overnight transformation of the Arabs from a majority to a minority in their own land.

The establishment of the state of Israel, which the Jewish people celebrate as the fulfillment of the dream of generations, is associated in the historic memory [of Palestinians] with the most difficult collective trauma of their chronology – the “Naqbah.” Even if nowadays they do not cite it day and night, the conception and birth of the state are inextricably linked to a polarized confrontation between two national movements that produced a protracted, bloody conflict. The content and symbols of the state, which are anchored in law and glorify the [Israeli] victories in this conflict, commemorate for the members of the Arab minority their own defeat. As such, it is doubtful whether they have a way to genuinely identify with it. Time may heal their pain, but the more their national awareness strengthens, the more they will judge the very establishment of the state as problematic.³³

Along with constant reminders of their minority status, there are also several laws that have placed limits on the Arab minority of Israel, namely the Law of Return in 1950, the Nationality Law of 1952, Amendment No. 9 of Section 7A to the Basic Law in 1985, and various land allocation policies involving the Jewish National Fund. These forms of legislation laid the foundation for legal discrimination against Israeli Arabs. The rationale behind much of the legislation was to maintain a Jewish majority by restricting

³³ Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 160. The authors used a direct quote from the final report of the Orr Commission in September, 2003.

the growth of the Arab minority. These laws are imposed under the banner of security from outside threats, but they also imply a perceived internal demographic threat from Arab population.

A. GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION

The Law of Return states that any Jew, regardless of origin, can immigrate to Israel and become a citizen.³⁴ The law makes no reference to the Arab population or Arab immigration which essentially restricts their access into the country. However, the borders of Israel are open year round for Jews because it is a Jewish state. “The right given in the Law of Return to Jews to immigrate to Israel is one of the only cases in Israeli legislation in which an overt distinction is made between the rights of Jews and non-Jews. The former are entitled to come into the country and settle there; the latter may only enter the country and settle there if they are granted permission to do so under the Entrance to Israel Law, 1952.”³⁵

Israel’s Nationality Law supplements the Law of Return by stating that “those who remained in Israel [after] the establishment of the State in 1948...became Israeli citizens by residence or by return.”³⁶ The Nationality Law also states the criteria for citizenship through naturalization, but the ultimate decision is made by the Minister of the Interior which makes it unlikely for an Arab to gain citizenship through this route.³⁷ Palestinian Arabs who did not flee in fear for their own safety or were able to avoid forceful expulsion by the Haganah were able to stay and become Israeli citizens, but the borders were otherwise closed to non-Jews. Those who did flee were essentially denationalized or “stripped of [their] nationality and [...] rendered stateless.”³⁸ In 1948

³⁴ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Law of Return 5710-1950,” http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law+of+Return+5710-1950.htm, (accessed on January 14, 2008).

³⁵ David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of Arabs in Israel* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), 36.

³⁶ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Acquisition of Israeli Nationality,” <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/State/Acquisition+of+Israeli+Nationality.htm>, (accessed on January 14, 2008).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Victor Kattan, “The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians,” *Nordic Journal of International Law* 74, (2005), 71.

and 1967, Palestinians fled to the surrounding Arab states, but were refused re-entry into their homeland due to Israel's Nationality Law.

Before Amendment No. 9 to Section 7A of the Basic Law was passed in 1985, section 7A outlined the individuals who were prohibited from applying for candidacy in the Knesset. The typical group of existing government officials, the President, military officers, state employees, etc., was listed in the terms of exclusion. In 1985, the following criteria were added to the exclusionary terms:

A candidates' list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if its objects or actions, expressly or by implication, include one of the following:

- (1) Negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people;
- (2) Negation of the democratic character of the State;
- (3) Incitement to racism³⁹

The first bullet that describes Israel "as the state of the Jewish people" was justifiably met with outrage by the Arab population. It implied that any Israeli Arab who wanted to apply for candidacy in the Knesset had to subordinate himself to his Jewish peers and accept their domination of his homeland. The two additional directives that refer to the "democratic character of the State" and "incitement of racism" are disturbingly ironic. Arab members of the Knesset suggested that the amendment refuse candidacy based on "denial of the existence of the state of Israel" without the implication of a state only for the Jewish people. Another idea was to change the wording to "state of the Jewish people and its Arab citizens," but that was also denied by the Knesset.⁴⁰ It is unfortunate that Israel's *democratic* government still enforces a policy of alienation on its Arab citizens who serve in the Knesset. The amendment serves as a constant reminder to Israeli Arabs that they will never truly be embraced by the state.

³⁹ "Basic Law: The Knesset," http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm, (accessed on November 29, 2007).

⁴⁰ Nadim Rouhana, "The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence to Challenge," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, no. 3 (Spring 1989), 51.

B. THE JEWISH NATIONAL FUND

The Jewish National Fund (JNF) was established at the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901 “to be used to build the foundations of a Jewish state.”⁴¹ The fund comprised of donations from Jews worldwide and was used to purchase land in Palestine and to finance various projects related to a future Jewish state.

In [the] first decade of its existence, land acquisition was not JNF-KKL’s only concern; JNF-KKL played a central role in establishing the first modern Jewish city Tel Aviv, acquiring land for the first collective community (known today as kibbutzim) and first workers’ community. JNF-KKL also set up and administered farms, continued its afforestation programs, which laid the foundation for JNF-KKL to become the leading environmental agency in the land of Israel, and was instrumental in founding secondary schools and pioneering higher education an impressive record of achievement in a country whose Jewish population at the time numbered 85,000.⁴²

The JNF truly played a large role in the development of Jewish land before the creation of Israel, but it wrongfully continued to serve a significant role in state affairs after 1948. In fact, the JNF benefitted immensely from the enforcement of discriminatory legislation to include the Absentee Property Regulations of 1948 and the creation of the Development Authority. When thousands of Palestinian Arabs fled their land or were forced off by Israeli forces at the start of the 1948 war, the Absentee Property Regulations essentially placed the Arab property in the hands of the Custodian of Absentee Property.

His function was to protect and preserve absentee property, but he had not received the legal right to dispose of it. In March 1950, the Absentee Property Law (which replaced the earlier Absentee Property Regulations) enabled the Custodian to sell land to a development authority when such a body would be established by the Knesset; any other sale or transfer was prohibited. The Development Authority was indeed established in August that year. The law permitted the Development Authority to sell land only to the state, the JNF, a municipal authority, or to an institution for the resettlement of landless Arabs. In September 1953, the Custodian sold all

⁴¹ Jewish National Fund, <http://www.jnf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=history>, (accessed on February 5, 2008).

⁴² Jewish National Fund, <http://www.jnf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=history>, (accessed on February 5, 2008).

of the property in his possession to the Development Authority. According to a review of activities in the Israel Government Yearbook (1959: 75), the JNF purchased 2,324,000 dunam [approximately 574,253 acres] from the Development Authority.⁴³

The state used numerous methods and created various agencies to acquire land from the Arab population, but they were all a way of funneling the property to the JNF. Once the JNF gained possession of expropriated Arab lands, the state was able to deny liability because the JNF was a private organization.

Another method used by the JNF was the planting of forests on land expropriated from Arabs in order to solidify ownership.

It's the Jews who during the 1970s began a campaign of "political plantings" – planting a forest was an easy way to establish your control over land, and a lot of the JNF plantings were carried out with that in mind. So the Arabs would interpret that as a move that threatened further expropriation of Arab-owned land, and they would plant olives on their own land in response.⁴⁴

The JNF website provides a different explanation for the planting of trees in Israel.

JNF has planted more than 240 million trees since 1901 to protect the land, green the landscape and preserve vital ecosystems. Through the generosity of donors like you, JNF continues this effort, planting seedlings, maintaining forest health, combating desertification, protecting watersheds and managing water flow.⁴⁵

This message tugs at the heartstrings of many would be donors who have a deep desire to preserve the environment in all parts of the world. The JNF website also advertises its current tree planting campaign as a way to "recognize or memorialize family, friends and

⁴³ David A. Wesley, *State Practices and Zionist Images: Shaping Economic Development in Arab Towns in Israel* (NY: Berghahn Books, 2006), 109.

⁴⁴ Wesley, 121.

⁴⁵ Jewish National Fund, "Work in Israel," <http://www.jnf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=workinisrael> (accessed on February 6, 2008).

loved ones.”⁴⁶ Environmental reasons may provide a valid justification for planting trees on land that was formerly owned by Arabs, but discriminatory ulterior motives are also evident.

The most recent controversy involving the JNF is the Jewish National Fund Bill that passed an initial reading in the Knesset by forty-eight votes in July 2007.⁴⁷ In order to understand the bill itself, it is important to address the events that preceded its introduction. The Israel Land Administration was created in 1960 to manage approximately ninety-three percent of Israel’s land that was “either the property of the state, the Jewish National Fund or the Development Authority.”⁴⁸ As was mentioned previously, the Development Authority basically served as a middleman between the ILA and the JNF. The blatantly anti-Arab land practices were unsuitable for a democratic state because government agencies were responsible for the distribution of land that was owned by a private Jewish organization. To remedy the situation, in 2004 the ILA decided that “it was no longer willing to compensate the JNF for land that it leased to non-Jews.”⁴⁹ Since land ownership is a tangible form of Jewish dominance in Israel, many MKs viewed the selling of JNF land to Arabs as a potential threat. Their response to the ILA decision was the JNF Bill. The bill basically allows the JNF, which controls thirteen percent of Israel’s land, to continue refusing to lease land to non-Jews. After passing the initial reading in the Knesset, the bill was met with harsh criticism by Israeli and U.S. media.⁵⁰ Many proponents of the bill have argued that “JNF’s property is the inheritance of the entire Jewish people; its mission is the task of building homes for a nation that has no other haven.”⁵¹ In contrast, opponents “argue that since the ILA is an

⁴⁶ Jewish National Fund, “Tree Planting Center,” https://secure2.convio.net/jnf/site/Ecommerce?store_id=3181&VIEW_HOMEPAGE=true&JServSessionId_r004=wbap1u5891.app20a (accessed on February 6, 2008).

⁴⁷ Leslie Susser, “JNF Feels Winds of Change,” *The Jerusalem Report* (September 3, 2007), 11.

⁴⁸ Israel Land Administration, “General Information,” http://www.mmi.gov.il/Envelope/indexeng.asp?page=/static/eng/f_general.html (accessed on February 6, 2008).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ For example, *Haaretz* printed an article entitled “The Racist Jewish State” and many American Jewish groups have called the bill a form of apartheid.

⁵¹ Jonathan S. Tobin, “The JNF vs. politically correct Zionism,” *The Jerusalem Post* (August 5, 2007), 13.

official arm of the government it must conduct all tenders, including those of the JNF, on the basis of full equality, no matter what the JNF's century-old charter says about holding land for the Jewish people in perpetuity."⁵² As long as the ILA claims to represent both the state and the JNF, it will continue to stir up controversy over biased land policies.

The examples of discrimination mentioned above are by no means an extensive list of policies and prejudicial practices against Arabs in Israel. There are many reasons why the Israeli government feels a need to promote discriminatory behavior. "The issue now at stake is nothing less than the Jewish character of the State. How can Israel continue to be a State of the Jews if twenty percent of its population is Arab?"⁵³ The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the fact that Israel is surrounded by Arab states only add to Jewish fears. Paradoxically, the unequal practices used to maintain the status quo in Israel may cause the Israeli Arab population to mobilize and absorb the collective identity of Palestinians in exile and in the occupied territories instead of an identity as Israeli citizens. Israel has every right to secure its borders and to identify valid threats, but failing to accept its own Arab minority as equal citizens will create internal opposition to the state that was formerly non-existent. Many of the biased laws in the Jewish state are based on principles that were arguably necessary during the first years of Israel's creation. Jewish paranoia was extremely high due to the offensive nature of the surrounding Arab states so legislation that placed physical security above democratic principles was seen as justifiable. As time progresses and Israel struggles to maintain its democratic nature, its Jewish majority will eventually need to accept that many of the state's biased laws are outdated and detrimental to the future of the country. The efforts to maintain the Jewishness of Israel at the expense of its democratic nature will ultimately tear the state apart from the inside.

⁵² Susser, 11.

⁵³ Louer, 2.

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III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOBILIZATION

Since the creation of Israel in 1948, its Arab citizens have remained politically passive despite its grievances against the state. Although there is a history of violent demonstrations among the Palestinians in the occupied territories, the Israeli security forces have dealt with a minimal amount of internal protests by Arab Israelis. Indeed, mobilization is not achieved through grievances alone which makes it a rare and difficult phenomenon. Tilly expressed the common difficulties of social mobilization by saying “people vary continuously from intensive involvement to passive compliance, interests vary from quite individual to nearly universal.”⁵⁴ Abundant dissent is only one of several factors that are necessary for social mobilization. During the first intifada, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians outside of Israel shared common grievances against the Jewish state. Military occupation and the encroachment of Jewish settlements onto Arab lands were only a few of those grievances.⁵⁵ However, the proper mobilizing structures and frames were never in place and the result was a weak foundation for collective action. This section will discuss the differences between the two intifadas and explain the factors that resulted in quiet opposition during the first uprising compared to violent protests in the second.

The outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000 marked a turning point in the passive mentality of Israel’s Arab minority. The sequence of events was started when Ariel Sharon, surrounded by armed bodyguards, visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem on September 28, 2000.⁵⁶ Massive demonstrations broke out both in Israel and the occupied territories that resulted in over a dozen Israeli Arab citizens killed by Israeli police and security forces. While Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif was the incident that sparked the riots, there were many underlying tensions that led up to the protests. Some of the more commonly cited motivations were:

⁵⁴ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 7.

⁵⁵ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (NY: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), 414.

⁵⁶ Matthew Kalman, “Controversial visit sparks violent clash in Jerusalem,” *USA TODAY*, September 29, 2000, 10A.

(1) The racial discrimination to which Arabs have been subjected; (2) disappointment in Ehud Barak's government; (3) the religious dimension of the al-Aqsa issue; (4) the Arab national dimension and empathy with the Palestinians of the occupied territories; and (5) the mounting anger at the Israeli police and their habitual practices against Arab citizens.⁵⁷

These explanations by former MK Azmi Bishara are valid, but they beg the question of why the Israeli Arabs failed to play a significant role in the first intifada? Between 1948 and the first intifada in 1987, the above explanations were applicable in everyday Israeli Arab life except for the disappointment with Ehud Barak's government and the al-Aqsa issue. Immediately after the first intifada, one Israeli Arab explained the difference between Palestinians inside Israel versus those outside by saying "there is a difference between players and fans. We are fans. Our goal is to live in Israel with equal rights, while the aim of the residents in the West Bank is to form a separate state."⁵⁸ In other words, the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza was worthy of Israeli Arab support as long as direct involvement was not necessary. Despite the loyalty that Israeli Arabs gave to the political process, they were not accepted as equals by the Jewish majority. The Israeli government continued to show the same amount of distrust toward Israeli Arabs as it did toward Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories. This became a contributing factor to the tensions that would lead to the second intifada when the Arabs inside and outside of Israel came as close as they ever would to collective action.

Another explanation for the Israeli Arab participation in the second intifada is the relative exclusion of Arabs from the political decision-making process after the victory of the Labor Party in 1999. The Arab community embraced the political process and was swayed by the slogan "The State for All" of the Labor Party.⁵⁹ The words were obviously aimed at the Arab population who sought equality as Israeli citizens. However, once Prime Minister Barak was in power, the Arabs were bitterly disappointed when a majority of the campaign promises went unfulfilled. Louer argues that the bitterness from the 1999 elections was still fresh in the minds of most Israeli Arabs when the intifada

⁵⁷ Azmi Bishara, "Reflections on October 2000: A Landmark in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, no. 3. (Spring 2001), 54.

⁵⁸ Kimmerling and Migdal, 182.

⁵⁹ Louer, 96.

began a year later. After watching Israeli security forces use live ammunition against Arab demonstrators at the al-Aqsa mosque, the Arab population gave up on the political process and met violence with more violence.⁶⁰ The violence transitioned to Arab unity at the polls in the form of a boycott during the February 2001 elections for prime minister. The importance of the Arab vote was solidified when the Labor Party eventually lost most of its political power to Likud. Since the boycott, the percentage of Arabs who take part in elections has gradually declined which sends signals of hopelessness in the political process. Yiftachel adds that “the chasm between Jewish and Arab political space has thus widened significantly in the recent past, seriously shrinking the ability of Palestinian Arab citizens to mobilize within the confines of Jewish tolerance and Israeli law.”⁶¹ If this is true, Israeli Arabs may eventually see violence as their only alternative.

An additional aspect of the second intifada is the structure and organization of the Palestinians during their protests. One of the most obvious differences between the two intifadas is the preponderance of violence in the second one. The Israeli Arab struggle for equal rights was consistently overshadowed by the violence in the occupied territories. This is largely due to a fractionalization in the leadership of the Palestinian people which resulted in a lack of clear goals for the movement. Almost two years after the start of the second intifada, a large group of Palestinian scholars and public figures signed a petition in order to curb the reliance on senseless violence against Israeli civilians. They had seen the effectiveness of peaceful protests during the first intifada and wanted to steer the second intifada in the same direction. In reference to suicide bombings, the “Petition of the 55” stated “we see that these bombings do not contribute towards achieving our national project which calls for freedom and independence. On the contrary, they strengthen the enemies of peace on the Israeli side...”⁶² There were two main factors that doomed the petition to failure: it was sponsored by the European Union and many of the Israeli Arabs who signed it lacked legitimacy in the resistance. Also, the western

⁶⁰ Louer, 202.

⁶¹ Oren Yiftachel, “The Shrinking Space of Citizenship: Ethnocratic Politics in Israel,” Joel Benin and Rebecca Stein, eds. *The Struggle for Sovereignty* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 167.

⁶² Lori Allen, “Palestinians Debate “Polite” Resistance to Occupation,” *Middle East Report*, no. 225. (Winter 2002), 39.

sponsorship of the petition tainted its validity in the eyes of many Palestinians and the signatories were believed to have ulterior motives. In reference to the signatories, a student leader in the PFLP commented that “those are the people whose interests are connected with the existence of the occupation. During peacetime, they are living a good life and working well, but when there is resistance, it works against their interests, they gain nothing.”⁶³ The failure of the petition to gain public support demonstrated the divide between the educated Palestinian elites and the rest of Palestinian society both inside and outside of Israel. This divide resulted in unorganized protests that quickly turned violent and gave the Israeli defense forces an excuse for massive retaliation.

Despite the initial violent displays of collective action by Israeli Arabs that marked the start of the second intifada, the uprising eventually became isolated in the occupied territories. The 2000 uprising was far more violent than the first intifada in 1987, but the Arabs in Israel continued to play a minor role in relation to Palestinians outside Israel’s borders. If anything, the violence by the Israeli Arabs was a show of frustration for several built up grievances, but not necessarily grievances shared by Palestinians in the occupied territories. Once the Israeli Arabs lashed out in anger and made their objections known to Israeli society, they returned to non-violent measures to challenge the state. Many reverted to political parties and religious movements while most used the boycott of elections as a show of political unity. Any resemblance of Arab mobilization within Israel was through a political means. The result was, and continues to be, an ineffective movement that is easily controlled within the boundaries of the political process.

Apt and resonating frames are necessary for a movement to create a shared identity among its members and to gain empathy for its cause. “Palestinian nationalism” is a common term among Israel’s Arab population, but the implications of its meaning are either misunderstood or wrongfully applied by Arab elites. According to Snyder, nationalism is “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that

⁶³ Allen, 40.

expresses and protects these distinctive characteristics.”⁶⁴ Therefore, it would be fair to say that Palestinian nationalism entails a unified desire for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state where its people share a similar history, culture, and representative institutions. In contrast, Israeli Arabs are seeking equal rights, education, and economic opportunities as citizens of Israel. Additionally, a large majority of Israeli Arabs would choose to stay in Israel if a Palestinian state was formed in the future.⁶⁵ The attempts of Israeli Arabs to identify with Palestinian nationalism in order to further their own unrelated struggle against Israel has been ineffective in the past, but the proper framing of the movement could give it new life.

A cost-benefit analysis of the second intifada shows that Palestinian Israelis did not find it in their best interest to continue the violence in the same fashion as their Palestinian brethren in the occupied territories. Many authors have argued that Israeli Arabs initially resorted to violence due to a lack of political representation. However, the motivation that was necessary for sustained violent collective action did not exist among Israel’s Arab population. As long as Israeli Arabs continue to enjoy a better lifestyle and comparatively more rights than Palestinians in the occupied territories, they will show great reluctance to truly identify with the Palestinian national cause. The Palestinian identity and the Palestinian cause of a sovereign state go hand in hand, but Israeli Arab leaders are trying to separate the two in order to use the Palestinian identity for their own political grievances. Meanwhile, the benefits of maintaining a relatively positive, yet discriminatory relationship with the Israeli state greatly outweigh the risks of collective action.

...citizenship played a fundamental role in the molding of the Arab citizens into a community. This was a consideration all the more important when, on the one hand, any mobilization was liable to be the object of police repression, while on the other, the Arab citizens were able to exercise from within a degree of influence on the political decision-making process. It is precisely because they enjoyed voting rights, within

⁶⁴ Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), 23.

⁶⁵ Smooha, 86.

a system in which more than elsewhere politics is the pre-eminent sphere of decision-making and influence, that the Arabs made a position for themselves within the political process.⁶⁶

Based on this observation, the Israeli Arab leaders might find more success by embracing their identities as Arab citizens of Israel with unequal rights rather than with the Palestinian cause of a sovereign state. A valid reason for the reassessment of identities is that the title of “Palestinian” has been reinforced with its own frames since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli Jews are more prone to gather connotations of terrorism or violence at the mention of the term “Palestinian.” When the Arab population in Israel chooses to label itself with a Palestinian identity, the Israeli government and the Jewish majority react with suspicion and distrust.⁶⁷ In the minds of the Jewish population, it also justifies feelings of discrimination and inequality because it sees the Palestinians as a security threat. Also, “the state of Israel has historically avoided the term “Palestinian” because of the implied recognition of the existence of such a national group and its rights.”⁶⁸ Arabs who embrace their identity as Israeli Arab citizens might not stir up the same emotional undertones brought on by the title of “Palestinian.” This would allow them to further their cause for equal rights as Israeli citizens without bringing up the negative connotations that are common with the Palestinian identity in Israel.

Lastly, while many Israeli Arabs may embrace Palestinian nationalism, they are not officially represented by Palestinian organizations such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization or the Palestinian Authority. This was a result of Yasir Arafat’s signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.⁶⁹ Therefore, the only time when Palestinians in Israel or the occupied territories identify with one another is when it is in their own respective best interests. If given the choice between the struggle for equal rights through Israeli

⁶⁶ Louer, 66.

⁶⁷ Smooha, 81.

⁶⁸ Rhoda Kanaaneh, “Embattled Identities: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 3 (Spring 2003), 9.

⁶⁹ Louer, 81.

citizenship or the Palestinian cause of an end to Israeli occupation and a sovereign state, Arab Israelis should not have a problem making a decision based on their own best interests.

A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Despite consistent discrimination by the Jewish majority, the Israeli Arab pattern of protest is inconsistent at best and it is difficult to pinpoint vital factors that could ignite future collective action. The dominant trend is that protests by Arabs in Israel have increased in number and intensity since 1975, but the entire community seldom unites under a common identity.⁷⁰ There are several theories on conflict and protest that provide further insight into situations similar to Israel's, but the most applicable theory for the Arab Israelis is Social Movement Theory (SMT). SMT scholars that include Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow stress three necessary factors of "political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes" for collective action to occur.⁷¹ Political opportunities asserts "that social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities" within their respective countries.⁷² Mobilizing structures refers to the necessary "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action."⁷³ Framing processes are the development of "shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation."⁷⁴ This section addresses historical events in Israeli Arab society that include forms of the three factors above in order to determine the probability for future collective action. Israel has successfully used co-optation to create political opportunities for segments of its Arab population that has in turn reduced their ability to build strong

⁷⁰ Oren Yiftachel, "The Political Geography of Ethnic Protest: Nationalism, Deprivation and Regionalism among Arabs in Israel," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 22, no. 1 (1997), 99.

⁷¹ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements," Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.

⁷² Ibid., 3.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 5.

mobilizing structures. Two significant events are used to exemplify this point: the Zionist co-optation of the Arab Druze population through military conscription and the voluntary service of Palestinian Arabs in the IDF. The second intifada is then used to explain how proper framing processes began to create a more organized and definable Israeli Arab identity.

After almost sixty years of living within the state of Israel, the Arab minority is still excluded from conscription in the military. However, the Druze population is the one exception to the rule because they are no longer labeled as Arabs by the Jewish state. It all started when the Israeli army created the “Minorities Unit” in 1948 in order to co-opt the Druze population. The new unit provided negligible combat power for the military, but it gave the Druze a sense of belonging within Israeli society. In 1949, the Druze were recruited for the Israeli police forces as well.⁷⁵ The integration of the Druze into the Jewish state was part of a calculated plan by the Israeli government to divide and control the overall Arab minority. “The policy aimed at weaning them away from the larger Palestinian Arab community by fostering ‘Druze particularism,’ the notion that Druze ethnicity and identity make them distinct from other Arabs.”⁷⁶ The Druze chose to identify with their religion instead of their Arab ethnicity because, in return, they were guaranteed a higher status in Israeli society. The Israeli government went to great lengths to ensure that an entirely new identity was created for the Druze separate from their former Arab identity. Furthermore, the willingness of the Druze elite to accept the offer of co-optation forever alienated their people from the rest of the Arab minority.

Shaykh Jaber Mu’addi was one of the first collaborators to approach the Zionist movement in 1948 due to his political aspirations and a desire for increased status in the Druze community.⁷⁷ He rallied support among the Druzes for “the obligatory conscription law of May 1956” which basically made it mandatory for Druzes to serve in the military once they turned eighteen years of age.⁷⁸ Once the act was passed, it was met

⁷⁵ Kais M. Firro, “Reshaping Druze Particularism in Israel,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2001), 41.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 45.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 44.

with massive objection by the Druze community, but the law is still in affect today. The Druze community did not always welcome the actions of the Druze elites, but the community still partook in the benefits that arose from the co-optation. Advantages of their new identity included a better education system, more job opportunities, and higher class status.⁷⁹ The change in identity that the Druzes went through in order to increase their opportunities within Israel was irreversible and their split from the rest of the Arab Israeli population was a constant reminder of the government's attempt to prevent the Arab minority from forming a cohesive unit. As many SMT scholars would argue, the Druzes changed their identity because it improved their situation. However, recent events show that the dissent of the Druze population toward the state is reaching a boiling point. Although the state formed the relationship with the Druze long ago, the alliance has been weakened by continued discrimination, Jewish settlement expansion into Druze territory, and police brutality in the Druze village of Peki'in.⁸⁰ If this trend continues, the Druze might seek other opportunities based on a united Arab identity with the Palestinians. Whether or not the Palestinians choose to include them is another story.

While the Druze population was co-opted through military conscription, there are also thousands of Palestinians in Israel who have voluntarily joined the army and security forces as well. There is limited research on this unique group of Palestinians in Israel, but Kanaaneh states that "an estimated 5,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel currently volunteer to serve in the Israeli military."⁸¹ The topic is virtually untouched by Jewish Israeli scholars as Kanaaneh implies in her work. Upon asking a Jewish Israeli academic for assistance on the subject of Palestinians serving in the Israeli military, Kanaaneh received the following reply:

I don't know what...you're talking [about]. Except [for] about a dozen...volunteers no Palestinians serv[e] in the Israeli military. Druze and Circassians are drafted and several hundreds of Bedouins (and perhaps some Arab Christians) serv[e] as volunteers. However [to the best of my]

⁷⁹ Dominic Moran, "Israel's state-Druze rift," *International Relations and Security Network*, November 16, 2007. www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18363 (accessed on December 10, 2007).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Kanaaneh, 6.

knowledge none of them perceived themselves as 'Palestinian.' If you're searching for ARABS in the Israeli military, this is another issue.⁸²

The difference between declaring oneself Palestinian or Arab is a choice of identity, to join the collective identity of Palestinians elsewhere or to remain distinct. A Palestinian serving in the Israeli army may effortlessly change his identity several times a day.

To be honest with you "How do you identify yourself?" is not a good question – it depends on where I am. If I am at the tax office or in the [Jewish] Mall I'm not going to go around shouting, "Hey, look at me, I'm a Palestinian." I'm not stupid. There, I identify myself as an Israeli Arab. If you ask me here in my village among the people of the village, I'll tell you I'm a Palestinian Arab. Everybody tailors his answer to the situation he is in. This is the reality.⁸³

These Arab citizens walk a fine line by joining the institution that has become a symbol of repression to Palestinian Arabs inside and outside of Israel. However, many of them believe the benefits of voluntary military service outweigh the costs, so they embrace their multiple identities. This phenomenon is not unique to Palestinians in Israel because people around the world do the same thing every day in their jobs, social groups, and religious gatherings. The ability of Palestinian Arabs to voluntarily change identities based on various circumstances is detrimental to the overall effort of collective mobilization. A unified uprising against the Israeli state by its own Arab citizens is an option that would require the recognition of one identity regardless of the impending hardship that it might entail. At this point, the majority of Arab Israelis embrace various identities that will improve their situation in the short term, but this prevents them from mobilizing under one common identity to force positive long term changes.

The second intifada in 2000 marked a rare period when Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel joined Palestinians in the occupied territories in violent protest. It also solidified a new regional Palestinian identity that was separate from Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories. After over fifty years of living inside Israel, the Arab population finally began to realize the importance of framing their own situation as separate from the nationalistic Palestinian identity in Gaza and the West Bank. In 1997, Yiftachel

⁸² Kanaaneh, 8-9.

⁸³ Ibid., 10.

conducted a study on Arab protest in the Galilee and found that “the emergence of a regional Palestinian identity in Israel and in the Galilee is still in its infancy but the process has the potential to influence the relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel during the critical years to come.”⁸⁴ The second intifada was the culmination of several repressed Arab grievances against the Jewish state, but it also served as a maturation period for the regional Palestinian identity. The Palestinian and Israeli Arab identities shared a common culture and background, but their objectives were different. Ashkenasi hints that during the first intifada, “socioeconomic concerns of Arabs within Israel may have more to do with self-identification than with the intifada.”⁸⁵ However, at that point the Israeli Arabs were still caught between the national Palestinian cause and their own regional issues. The emerging regional Palestinian identity was still in its initial stage, but it was developing and gaining legitimacy among the Arab population. At the advent of the second intifada, the major concerns of Israeli Arabs were equal rights and fair treatment within the Jewish state and the uprising provided an outlet for their dissent. By framing their own struggle around the intifada in the occupied territories, the Israeli Arabs were able to capitalize on the Palestinian identity to rally support for their own cause. The increase in violent protest during the second intifada demonstrated that the new identity within Israel was gaining statewide momentum. Developments after 2001 have shown that a new generation of Arabs is now shaping the regional Palestinian identity to counter their Israeli identity.

⁸⁴ Yiftachel, 104.

⁸⁵ Abraham Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences: Israel's and Jerusalem's Arabs* (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 55.

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IV. THE STAND-TALL GENERATION

Despite their brief uprising against the state, the situation of the Arab minority in Israel has not improved since the second intifada began in October 2000. It is evident that political solutions will continue to provide little to no progress since anti-discriminatory legislation is passed in the Knesset, but seldom enforced on the local level. For example, the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty from 1994 states that “all persons are entitled to protection of their life, body, and dignity” and “no search shall be conducted on the private premises of a person, nor in the body or personal effects.”⁸⁶ Like most of Israel’s basic laws, the Human Dignity Law purposely leaves much room for interpretation. Using discriminatory practices against Arabs as evidence, the definition of “dignity” that is upheld by the state would vary between Jews and non-Jews. Also, the rights of Arabs are quickly tossed aside once the state brings national security to the forefront. Similar discrepancies are abundant in recent Israeli legislation, but that has been addressed in previous chapters. Fortunately for the Arab minority, there are still available methods for forging ahead in the struggle for equality.

Education has a way of providing a new perspective on an old situation. A few words used to describe the Israeli Arabs two generations ago were weak, easily dominated, uneducated, and unorganized.⁸⁷ In contrast, the emerging generation of Arabs in Israel has found that education opened their eyes to the world around them. “[The Stand-Tall Generation’s] representatives and leaders, many of them women, display a new assertive voice, abrasive style, and unequivocal substantive clarity. They have unmitigated determination, confidence, and a sense of entitlement the likes of which had only seldom been articulated previously by Palestinians addressing the Israeli mainstream.”⁸⁸ This new generation is aware of the wrongs that are committed against Arab society on a daily basis and they are more capable to do something about it than any generation before them. “Widespread literacy, access to higher education and

⁸⁶ “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,” http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm, (accessed on February 13, 2008).

⁸⁷ Shihade, 37.

⁸⁸ Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 2-3.

professional mobility of the elites, as well as access to the media, are all factors which would have progressively allowed the Arab citizens to become aware of the policies of domination to which they have been subjected, and to organize themselves collectively with a view to take counter action.”⁸⁹ In order to create the environment for a burgeoning social movement to thrive in Israel, it is necessary to utilize proper framing processes, mobilizing structures, and political opportunities. In this chapter, social movement theory will be applied to the Israeli Arab situation that arose after the initial events of the second intifada in 2000. Apt and resonating frames and counterframes have been employed by the Arab population and the state through Israelization and Palestinization to form respective identities within Israeli society. Meanwhile, established organizations like Adalah and the Islamic Movement along with emerging groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir are potential mobilizing structures that could gain massive support if utilized properly. This chapter will conclude by addressing various political opportunities that have emerged in recent years to include Arab election boycotts and anti-Arab rhetoric that has become common among Jewish government officials.

A. EFFECTIVE FRAMES

Israelization and Palestinization are two examples of framing processes that are at work within the Israeli Arab community. Israelization refers to “the extent to which [Israeli Arabs] have internalized the Israeli world view” as well as “their degree of acceptance of the established order.”⁹⁰ Another definition given by Dan Rabinowitz is the attempt by the Jewish state “to control the [Arab] community’s intellectual energy and political awareness in a futile effort to cultivate docile, depoliticized, submissive subjects.”⁹¹ In contrast, Palestinization is the degree to which Israeli Arabs embrace the Palestinian national struggle that is a reality in the occupied territories. The Jewish majority believed that greater education for Arabs in Israeli universities along with immersion in Israeli society would assist in the creation of a pro-Israel worldview among

⁸⁹ Louer, 47.

⁹⁰ Louer, 109.

⁹¹ Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 13.

the Arab minority. The result has been twofold: some educated Arabs have become immersed in Israeli society and accept the social order while others have gained a new awareness of the discriminatory practices against them.

Israelization has been an effective state tool with a portion of the Arab minority due to the influence of western modernism and secularism, not norms and values that are exclusive only to Israeli society. Many Arab youth grow up in a sheltered village environment where Muslim parents shield them from the temptations of secularism. Once they travel away from home and attend university, the Islamic moral boundaries grow thin and they are able to experience new and fascinating things that were never dreamed of in their villages. Taboo practices that Arab college students are able to engage in range from late night partying to sexual exploration.⁹² Furthermore, other Arabs embrace the Israeli identity as more than just a means of experimentation. “A significant number of [the Stand-Tall Generation’s] members have been socialized in the apolitical manner intended by the state and administered through its formal education system...individuals with a barren sensibility have emerged, fearful of political involvement, merely seeking ‘to get along’ and find safe havens in the middle ground.”⁹³ These individuals tend to see traditional Arab society as a world that is stuck in the past and Israeli society as the path to the future. Despite their newfound beliefs, those who graduate from an Israeli university and then decide not to get involved in the struggle for equal rights are a vital group among Israeli Arabs. They are the ones who must be convinced of the benefits of collective action in order to achieve unity among the Stand-Tall Generation.

Arab dissent is increasing within Israel as more educated Arabs are capable of using proper outlets and staging protests in order to speak out against the state. Although the outspoken Arabs are a product of both Israelization and Palestinization, the Israeli government labels many of them as militant due to their pro-Palestinian stance.

An observation yet more significant concerning the idea of the ‘conciliatory’ quality of Israelisation, which at the same time hints its limitations, is the view held by certain Jewish opinion-formers regarding

⁹² Lauer, 123.

⁹³ Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 137.

the figures who head the Arab political scene in Israel today. The prevailing rhetoric, which castigates without hesitation the militancy of the Arab Knesset members, overlooks rather too readily that fulsome praise has in the past been heaped on a number of them, on whom high hopes were once placed, precisely because they were highly 'Israelised'. This was particularly so with Azmi Bishara, who was at one time seen as the bridge capable of uniting Arabs and Israelis...⁹⁴

Once Bishara's Israelization began to take on a new form of Palestinization, his once supportive peers in the Knesset were quick to turn against him. He recently fled to Egypt in April of 2007 after allegations of collaborating with Hezbollah surfaced against him.⁹⁵ Bishara's case is more severe than most, but examples of Israelization working against the state are abundant throughout Israel. Other Palestinians have volunteered for the Israeli Defense Forces, the ultimate form of Israelization, in order to legitimate future claims of discrimination.⁹⁶ Arab Student Unions (ASUs) are also a common counter-Israelization tool within Israeli universities. "[They] convey to the students their obligation as the educated class to identify with and further national pride and awareness."⁹⁷ An educated Arab minority is a double edged sword for the state because although the benefits of modernization are displayed to the younger generation, they also become trained to think analytically which pushes them toward Palestinization. In a way, Palestinization would not be as possible on a large scale if it was not for Israelization. "[A]cculturation is at one and the same time the necessary condition for the possibility of counter-acculturation, since the counter-acculturation is a necessary dialectical movement emerging from any process of reversal of the definitions of self imposed by the dominant culture."⁹⁸ The struggle of the Palestinians outside of Israel is a difficult topic for Israeli

⁹⁴ Louer, 110.

⁹⁵ Isabel Kershner, "Israel Reveals New Details of Allegations Against Ex-Lawmaker," *The New York Times*, May 3, 2007. A1, 10.

⁹⁶ Kanaaneh, 5-6.

⁹⁷ Lauren Erdreich, "Instructive ritual: the Arab Student Union and the communitas of the Palestinian Israeli educated," *Social Analysis* 50, no. 3 (December 2006), 128.

⁹⁸ Louer, 129.

Arabs to ignore regardless of their own higher standard of living. Even those who embrace an Israeli identity must willingly overlook the discriminatory environment around them or rationalize it.

There are many powerful frames that are at work in Israel and its definition as a Jewish state is perhaps the most powerful, yet detrimental, frame of all. It clearly states who can identify with the nation as well as who will never identify with it. New Jewish citizens entering the country through Ben-Gurion International Airport are greeted with immediate frames of belonging once badges are pinned to their chests that read “I’ve come home.”⁹⁹ The same greeting is not reserved for Arab citizens. “An Arab’s status as a citizen inside the Jewish state is immediately made clear the moment he enters the airport and produces his passport for inspection by one of the young Jewish officials who are charged with assessing the security threat posed by each passenger. The main criterion use by security personnel is not whether the traveler is an Israeli or a non-Israeli but a Jew or non-Jew.”¹⁰⁰ The Arab minority has never really developed any effective counter-frames that resonate with all non-Jews in the country. This inability to counter the Jewish majority essentially creates the pitiful identity of cowering victims in their own homeland.

Membership in a nation is a constitutive factor of personal identity. The self-image of individuals is highly affected by the status of their national community. The ability of individuals to lead a satisfying life and to attain the respect of others is contingent on, although not assured by, the ability to view themselves as active members of a worthy community. A safe, dignified and flourishing national existence thus significantly contributes to their well-being.¹⁰¹

Effective frames in Israeli society, regardless of the audience, most commonly take the form of slogans that effectively widen the gap between Arabs and Jews. Popular Jewish slogans in the past have dealt with matters ranging from population transfer (“Jordan is

⁹⁹ Susan Nathan, *The Other Side of Israel* (NY: Doubleday, 2005), 40.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 80.

¹⁰¹ Tamir Yael, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 73.

Palestine”¹⁰²) to Zionism (“a land without people for a people without land”¹⁰³). Israeli Arabs have created slogans and symbols to gain support, but they are usually based on a similar overarching movement that is not unique to their own situation. “Islam is the Answer” was a popular slogan for the Islamic Movement in Israel’s 1989 elections, but it was a catchphrase that was floating around the entire Muslim world at the time.¹⁰⁴ In the same fashion, prime minister candidate Ehud Barak used the slogan “A State for All” in order to effectively entice Arab voters toward his Labor party in 1999 only to turn his back on them once he was elected.¹⁰⁵ Based on these examples, various framing techniques have resonated with the Arab population even when they were misguided or insincere.

Since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, several factors have emerged that will continue to draw the Arab population closer to collective action. In some cases, Arab elites methodically stage protests against the state and in other cases, the protests seem to spontaneously erupt due to overwhelming Arab dissent. The protests are usually local events that never result in collective action, but they are signs that Israeli Arabs are becoming more vocal against the state. In terms of mobilization, Arabs in Israel seem to wait for Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza to take the lead. Even then, their likelihood of taking part in the collective action depends on their own political situation at the time. The most effective frames used for mobilization have come out of the occupied territories due to the greater sense of urgency that emanates from the Israeli occupation. The new Stand-Tall generation in Israel has grown up surrounded by both effective and ineffective frames which should make them capable of creating symbols and slogans that resonate with the Arab minority. If not, they will surely wait for their brethren in Gaza and the West Bank to do it for them.

¹⁰² Elia Zureik, “Demography and Transfer: Israel’s Road to Nowhere,” *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 4. (August 2003), 627.

¹⁰³ Nathan, 45.

¹⁰⁴ Alisa Rubin Peled, “Towards autonomy? The Islamist movement’s quest for control of Islamic institutions in Israel,” *The Middle East Journal* 55, no. 3 (Summer 2001), 381.

¹⁰⁵ Lauer, 96.

B. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

According to McCarthy, mobilizing structures are “those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular ‘tactical repertoires,’ particular ‘social movement organizational’ forms, and ‘modular social movement repertoires.’”¹⁰⁶ In terms of Israeli Arabs, the extensive list of potential mobilizing structures includes village councils, non-governmental organizations, student unions, political groups, etc.,. Kriesi explains the importance of four different types of mobilizing structures that exist within social movements. Social Movement Organizations (SMOs), “supportive organizations,” “movement associations,” and “parties and interest groups” are vital facets to collective action, but only SMOs require direct involvement by a constituency.¹⁰⁷ While the other groups are still necessary for a successful movement, they consist of “friendly media, churches, restaurants, print shops, or educational institutions, which contribute to the social organization of the constituency of a given movement without directly taking part in the mobilization for collective action.”¹⁰⁸ Israeli Arabs tend to follow a similar pattern of showing support for collective action without getting directly involved. The second intifada was an exception to the norm, but they quickly fell back into their comfort zone after the initial protests were over. A majority of the Arab population will have to get their hands dirty in order to give mobilizing structures enough support to create long term change. Many groups lie on the fringe of moving from support to direct involvement, but they need the right opportunity to make the transition.

One of the more important groups that would fall under the banner of a supportive organization is the student union, and more specifically, the Arab Student Union (ASU). The emergence of the Stand-Tall generation is partially due to the unrecognized ASUs in Israeli universities.

¹⁰⁶ John D. McCarthy, “Constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting, and inventing,” Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 141.

¹⁰⁷ Hanspeter Kriesi, “The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context,” Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 152.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

From its inception, the ASU has espoused a declared aim to identify with national issues both inside and outside of Israel. The ASU provides a full cultural life for students. Often even before they arrive on campus, students are contacted by the ASU. Contact continues through the delivery of information sheets on the political situation, newspapers, posters with national slogans and pictures, and notices of activities sent to dorm rooms.[...]At universities in Israel in which most Palestinian students live away from home and board in the dormitories, this subset is brought together as a packaged audience. The ASU plays an active role in tapping into this resource and instructing in-gathered students into a new identity and role.¹⁰⁹

The ASU plays a large role in mobilizing Arab students for political matters which influences their willingness for political participation after college graduation. Not all Arab university students are members of an ASU, but “all current major Palestinian-Israeli political figures were once active in the ASU.”¹¹⁰ Leaflets passed out by ASU connected students have recently been the focus of controversy at Haifa University. Students passed out fliers calling for the Arab reoccupation of Jerusalem, but the papers were quickly confiscated by campus security since the university had not pre-approved the message.¹¹¹ MK Alex Miller responded to the incident by saying, “The students distributing this material are guilty of incitement and are not worthy to be neither the university’s students nor citizens of Israel. I intend to demand President Shimon Peres’ involvement in denouncing the leaflets’ writers and distributors.”¹¹² A similar situation occurred in January 2007 when Jewish residents of B’nei Brak, a town on the outskirts of Tel Aviv, passed out fliers banning the rental of rooms to Arab university students. Despite Arab attempts to pursue a criminal investigation, nothing was done to remedy the situation.¹¹³ The fliers passed out by Haifa University students were not the most well thought out ideal, but they were harmless compared to the direct discrimination of the

¹⁰⁹ Erdreich, 129-130.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 129.

¹¹¹ Ynetnews.com, “Leaflets at Haifa U. call for Arabs to reoccupy Jerusalem,” *Israel Faxx*, November 14, 2007 (accessed February 18, 2008).

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ “Arab Cabinet Pick Stirs ‘Zionism-Racism’ Debate; Rice, on Mideast Tour, Makes Time for Hardliner Lieberman,” *The Forward*, January 17, 2007, A1.

B'nei Brak residents. Given the proper political opportunity along with effective frames, the ASUs in Israel could serve as a vital mobilizing structure to exploit such blatant double standards.

Palestinian Israeli non-governmental organizations (PINGOs) are another mobilizing structure within Israeli Arab society. Groups like Adalah, The Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA), and the Mossawa Center strive to gain Arab equal rights through the legal process. Upon graduation, many university students who were members of the ASU become involved in one of the numerous Palestinian NGOs. Since the Israeli government's main purpose is to represent the Jewish interests of the state, the NGOs become the most efficient forum for Arab voices to be heard and then relayed to the state.¹¹⁴ The websites for these organizations are filled with constant news and updates concerning the struggle for Arab equal rights in Israel. Adalah, which means "justice" in Arabic, publishes an annual report of its activities in order to gain more support and to show Arab citizens any progress that has been made on pertinent issues. In 2007, the organization produced a "Democratic Constitution" since the Israeli government has never formally drafted a constitution. Adalah's version "respects the freedoms of the individual and the rights of all groups in equal measure, gives proper weight to the historical injustices committed against Arab citizens of Israel, and deals seriously with the social and economic rights of all."¹¹⁵ Although the Israeli government would never truly consider the constitution, it still serves as evidence that the Arab minority is not happy with the current ethnocentric government and that it is willing to engage in civil discussions to make positive changes. The HRA and the Mossawa Center partake in similar ventures as Adalah by exposing discriminatory practices throughout Israel and then finding enough support, either nationally or internationally, to force government action. Mossawa has also drafted a constitution to give the Arab public a sample of what it hopes to achieve with their support.

¹¹⁴ Shany Payes, "Palestinian NGOs in Israel: A Campaign For Civic Equality in a Non-Civic State," *Israel Studies* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 64.

¹¹⁵ Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, "The Democratic Constitution," <http://www.adalah.org/eng/constitution.php> (accessed February 19, 2008).

The most recent events that have called the PINGOs to action are the Attorney General's decision to drop charges against Israeli police snipers who killed thirteen Arab citizens in October 2000¹¹⁶ and the October 2007 events in a Druze village where Israeli police used live ammunition on protesters.¹¹⁷ The majority of the NGOs' work consists of awareness campaigns to keep the Arab public informed of unfolding events. The website for the Mossawa Center states that the organization "utilizes various methods, including advocacy in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) and government, socio-economic research and analysis, public information campaigns, capacity building with a broad network of Arab NGOs, and cooperative work with Local Councils as well as Israeli based and international NGOs."¹¹⁸ Most PINGOs mention similar methods in their mission statements and the resulting network that is created from the vast array of connections serves as an extremely capable mobilizing structure. Specific projects and methods may vary from one NGO to another, but the majority of them share the blanket mission of achieving equal rights for Arab citizens of Israel. While Israel can still pass discriminatory legislation and treat Arabs as second class citizens, the legislators know that the PINGOs will broadcast the news to the Arab population immediately after it happens. This tactic has not resulted in collective action, but that is not necessarily what the NGOs are intending to achieve. Their main concern is change through the legal and political process even though they can also rally many of their networks together as structures for mobilization.

PINGOs are an important counter balance for the Arab minority against the discriminatory policies of the state. Without them serving as reputable watchdogs, the Arab population would have little to rely on besides local councils and a few Arab members of the Knesset as representatives. The jobs and opportunities provided by PINGOs are also valuable to both educated and uneducated Arabs. PINGOs "fill a

¹¹⁶ The Mossawa Center, "Mossawa launches public awareness campaign on the killing of Arab citizens following Attorney General's decision," <http://www.mossawacenter.org/default.php?lng=3&dp=2&fl=25&pg=1>, (accessed February 19, 2008).

¹¹⁷ Dominic Moran, "Israel's state-Druze rift," *International Relations and Security Network*, November 16, 2007. www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18363 (accessed on February 19, 2008).

¹¹⁸ The Mossawa Center, "About Mossawa," <http://www.mossawacenter.org/default.php?lng=3&pg=2&dp=1&fl=25>, (accessed February 19, 2008).

vacuum by providing needed social services” and “it is telling of the role of PINGOs in their community that they employ nearly double the rate of employees as their Jewish counterparts.”¹¹⁹ The simple fact that there is a comparable number of NGOs in Israel to some developing countries shows that there is a sincere need for them among the Arab community; however, besides state enforced restrictions, the basic structure of NGOs usually makes them capable of only limited change in their respective societies. Payes states that critics of NGOs argue “the limitation of NGOs are tied to their tendency to promote technical rather than political solutions to problems, which reduces pressure on the state rather than challenging the roots of inequality, their lack of coordination and splintered representation, the fact that they are not elected institutions and hence base their legitimacy on state recognition, and their dependency on external donors, who sometimes dictate agenda for action.”¹²⁰ On one hand, the vast networks created by NGOs can actually make them disorganized and ineffective if not properly utilized. On the other hand, most of the PINGOs described above strive for the same goal of Arab equality in Israel, which means mobilizing their respective networks under a collective entity would be possible with the right frames and political opportunities.

The last group that has recently shown potential as a mobilizing structure is the Islamists. The Islamic movement and Hizb ut-Tahrir respectively represent one group that has been at the forefront of the Israeli Arab political and social scene and another that is starting to emerge as the representative for the Palestinian national identity. The use of Islam as a force for social movements is nothing new in the Middle East, but it has been kept at bay by the Israeli government. Being surrounded by Muslim countries only adds to the Jewish paranoia that Muslim Arab citizens of Israel could become a potential Trojan horse. Most Islamic organizations in Israel began as basic service providers for local communities and then expanded to politics once they acquired a loyal constituency. The majority of members do not join due to strong religious beliefs, but because of the social services provided. When asked about her support of the Islamic movement, one Israeli Arab woman replied, “People don’t vote for them for religious reasons. The

¹¹⁹ Payes, 64.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 61.

Islamists have cleaned up the streets and provided services. End the discrimination and you'll see the end of the support for them.”¹²¹ One of the first of Israel's Islamic organizations began in the late 1970s and was called the Society for Piety and Benevolence. Its main purpose at the time “was to fight against the ‘moral decadence’ which now in their view typified Arab society in Israel.”¹²² The organization eventually helped to set up schools and furthered the pursuit of organized Islam in Israel. Several of the members of the Society for Piety and Benevolence became sheikhs and eventually assisted Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish in setting up the Islamic movement.¹²³ Other Islamic organizations and programs that exist in Israel today can be traced back to the Society for Piety and Benevolence, but the Islamic movement is one of the most prominent.

Although the Islamic movement was founded in the early 1980s, it refused inclusion in the Israeli political process until 1989 when it was successful in local elections within Arab towns and then in 1996 when it officially became a political party.¹²⁴ Before its emergence onto the political scene, the movement focused on grassroots projects as it “established schools, clinics, and camps in a number of Arab communities, all of which [gave] it legitimacy and generated popular support.”¹²⁵ The organization then split up over a disagreement between the northern and southern factions concerning political participation. The southern Islamic movement decided to join the political process while the northern faction, led by Sheikh Raed Salah, boycotted national elections and remained at the municipal level. In the 1996 elections, the southern Islamic movement had a large enough constituency to win two seats in the Knesset.¹²⁶ The Islamic movement continues to achieve limited success in Israeli national elections which leads many Israeli Arabs to believe that the Jewish dominated government is giving them

¹²¹ Eetta Prince-Gibson, “Land (Swap) for Peace?” *The Jerusalem Report* (November 26, 2007), 16.

¹²² Louer, 140-141.

¹²³ Ibid., 146.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 148.

¹²⁵ Mark Tessler and Audra K. Grant, “Israel's Arab Citizens: The Continuing Struggle,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 555, Israel in Transition, (January 1998), 107.

¹²⁶ Louer, 148.

just enough political inclusion to keep them content without actually granting any significant power.¹²⁷ Islamic institutions that focus on the community instead of political elections approach their role as a mobilizing structure in a different way.

The Muslim paradigm, while clearly on the ascent, is likewise limited in its capacity to form a new focus for Palestinian self-perception. As elsewhere, emerging technologies and new transnational communication networks notwithstanding, youngsters seek to articulate identity and solidarity in terms of secular, local and national paradigms. The Islamic movements in the territories and inside Israel do not offer a radical alternative to national identity. Their strength hinges on their promise to provide a more determined and effective pursuit of the nationalist agenda and, in the case of youngsters and territories, a more empowering way to cope with the humiliation and oppression of daily life under occupation.¹²⁸

Regardless of its non-participation in national elections, Sheikh Salah's Islamic movement has a strong following that he has attempted to mobilize in the past. One such time was in March of 2007 when the fiery sheikh "called on Muslims to stage an uprising against Israel as it move[d] ahead with plans to replace a crumbling dirt ramp" that led into the compound known as the Temple Mount to Jews and the Noble Sanctuary to Muslims.¹²⁹ Salah was arrested soon afterward for "scuffling with an Israeli police officer" and trying to incite trouble. The sheikh had already been arrested and jailed in 2003 on charges of raising money for Hamas which resulted in his label as a "ticking time bomb" by several Jewish MKs.¹³⁰ Although Salah has numerous followers within the Islamic movement, the protests at the construction site never resulted in an uprising. To Israel's dismay, the majority of Israeli Arabs agreed with Sheikh Salah's actions despite disagreement with many of his conservative religious and political views. The dissent felt toward Israel has caused many Israeli Arabs to take the side of anyone who stands up against the state regardless of the cause. The only problem is that most Arabs

¹²⁷ Orly Halpern, "Frustration keeps many Arabs home," *The Jerusalem Post*, (March 28, 2006), 20.

¹²⁸ Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 115.

¹²⁹ Dion Nissenbaum, "Israel's 'ticking time bomb'; Arab-Israeli sheik – He's called for an uprising over work at a holy site," *The Seattle Times*, (March 8, 2007), A10.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

are unwilling to get directly involved for fear of repercussions from the state. So they might donate money, boycott elections, or stage a protest but the results are usually limited and temporary at best.

The Islamic movement is an influential mobilizing structure within Arab society because it has invested large amounts of time and money in several Arab towns and villages. In turn, its constituency is likely to show more loyalty than that of a normal political party. Israeli Arabs did not rally around Sheikh Salah at the construction site because it was not an opportunity that would resonate with enough people to force collective action. Given the proper frames and a well timed political opportunity, the Islamic movement could serve as an effective mobilizing structure. The organization's ability to stage large protests against the state has deemed it as "the most radical anti-Israel group in Israel" according to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.¹³¹

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) or the Party of Liberation is a worldwide Islamic organization that has been around since the early 1950s, but has limited its activities in Gaza and the West Bank until recent years. Many of the group's ideological beliefs are seen as radical, but its strategic goals are conservative.

The party rejects contemporary efforts to establish Islamic states, claiming that Sudan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia do not meet the necessary criteria. Instead, Hizb ut-Tahrir wants to reestablish the Islamic state that existed in the seventh century under the Prophet Muhammad and his first four successors. This state would be led by a Caliph, a supreme leader who would combine religious and political power, elected by an assembly, which would in turn be elected by the people. The Caliph would appoint an *Amir*, or military leader, who would declare *jihad* against non-Muslim countries.¹³²

These beliefs may seem radical for Arab residents of Israel and maybe even Palestinians in the occupied territories. Nevertheless, the support gained by HT could be due to a lack of faith in the Israeli political process or abandonment of hope for a two state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The residents of the occupied territories have also

¹³¹ Nissenbaum, A10.

¹³² Emmanual Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 317.

been disappointed by the inefficiency and eternal conflict between the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and Fatah. Although the majority of supporters have come from the occupied territories, there are many Israeli Arabs who have attended HT sponsored gatherings as well. In the past, Israeli Arabs have collectively mobilized around protests that occurred in the occupied territories, so this new player in the Palestinian power struggle could potentially introduce new forms of mobilizing structures to rally Arabs on both sides of Israel's green line.

Founded in 1953 by Taqim al-Din al-Nabhani, Hizb ut-Tahrir thrived on the unstable environment of the Middle East where receptive and impoverished audiences had turned away from the corrupt and illegitimate structures of the state. After failed coup attempts in Jordan and Iraq, the group went underground in the Middle East after 1972. HT has always had a following in the occupied territories and the current struggle between Hamas and Fatah has presented an opportunity for HT to obtain a stronger foothold in the area. The organization has also utilized the extensive attention and media coverage given to Hamas and Fatah to slip under Israel's radar in West Bank and Gaza. An Israeli commentator on Palestinian affairs stated that "since the group eschews violence, preferring instead to wait for some 'coup de grace' in the form of a divinely ordained moment of international jihad, Israeli and Palestinian security forces have not viewed them as a major threat...but they are not a vegetarian movement."¹³³ Middle Eastern countries are more concerned about HT's political ideology of overthrowing existing governments than their lack of violence. As a result, the group has been banned in most of the Middle East which led to its emergence in other regions. A commitment to non-violence enables HT to thrive in various parts of the world, to include western democracies, where violent groups are outlawed.¹³⁴ In contrast to its non-violent stance, the group does not believe in peace talks with Israel and also supports the overthrow of the Jewish state along with all other western backed Middle East regimes. There are three main factors that increase the likelihood of HT's ability to start a social movement among

¹³³Ilene R. Prusher, "Palestinian group sounds like Al Qaeda but forgoes violence," *Christian Science Monitor*, (January 22, 2008), 1.

¹³⁴ The group has also avoided a place on the U.S. State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Israel's Arab minority. The group does not condone violence, it "has shown it can put tens of thousands of supporters into the streets," and its leaders understand that timing is a vital key to collective action.¹³⁵ These attributes are similar to the concepts of mobilizing structures and political opportunity within the SMT framework. The addition of strategic framing is applicable to HT's ability to convince its members that protest is worthwhile.

Due to its experience as a worldwide movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a considerable advantage over both Hamas and Fatah. The organization's understanding of social mobilization has grown from experiences in over forty five countries.¹³⁶ The extensive knowledge of symbols, framing, and opportunity that HT has amassed in the numerous cultures of its constituency would surely give it an advantage in mobilizing the residents in the occupied territories. The group has not realized its main goal of an Islamic state in any of the countries where its message is spread, but people are listening and joining. Furthermore, every leader of the organization has been a Palestinian and HT receives considerable support from Palestinians whether they are in the diaspora, the occupied territories, or within Israel itself.¹³⁷ Recent events have served as warning signs that HT is planning to join the political fray in the West Bank and Gaza. Several HT rallies took place in Ramallah, Tul Karm, and Gaza in 2007 and members of the group have gradually taken over the prayer services at Jerusalem's al-Aqsa mosque. The group has also "launched a youth movement to compete with those of Hamas and Fatah, called Ashbal al-Khilafa, the Lion Cubs of the Caliphate."¹³⁸ As the group becomes more engrained in Palestinian society, its ideology and beliefs will spread to Israeli Arabs as well. The potential of Hizb ut-Tahrir to become a mobilizing structure for Israeli Arabs is dependent on the group's success at mobilizing the Palestinians in the occupied territories. As the political climate continues to worsen in West Bank and Gaza, people

¹³⁵ Prusher, 1.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ehud Ya'ari, "A Name Worth Remembering: Hizb Al-Tahrir," *The Jerusalem Report*, (October 1, 2007), 28.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 27.

will grow frustrated and possibly turn to HT as the only alternative to the status quo. A Palestinian resident of Ramallah explained his reasons for supporting Hizb ut-Tahrir with the following statement.

It's only natural that people feel threatened by the PA and look at it as a collaborator. People feel the Palestinian Authority is not with the people. Hamas started with a similar ideology, but time has proven that the liberation of Palestine is not going to go according to Hamas' route, through resistance. At the same time, Palestinians don't think that the answer lies in Fatah's approach – a negotiated settlement with foreign intervention and aid. The only route is with the march of armies under the rule of the caliph. Anything else, including tit-for-tat violence and especially peace talks, is a waste of time. Talks are not only useless and futile, but they're very destructive. These negotiations are geared to protect the security of Israel. The majority of people support this view and support Hizb ut-Tahrir.¹³⁹

HT's patient outlook of waiting for the right opportunity and its refusal to participate in political elections might make it difficult to maintain overwhelming support in the occupied territories over the long run; however, its supporters are continuing to grow in the short run.

The amount of potential mobilizing structures within Israeli Arab society is innumerable and the groups mentioned above are just some of the key players. McCarthy states that "in any concrete social setting, a range of mobilizing structural elements are more or less available to activists as they attempt to create new movements or nurture and direct ongoing ones."¹⁴⁰ Family ties, friendship and work networks, neighborhoods, etc., are all readily available as mobilizing structures and successful activists have the ability to determine which ones can actually further their cause. Only time will tell if the Arab Student Unions, Palestinian NGOs, or the Islamic organizations will properly utilize the mobilizing structures at their disposal both inside and outside of Israel. Recent events have shown that they are all learning from the past and developing new methods of countering the Israeli government.

¹³⁹ Prusher, 3.

¹⁴⁰ McCarthy, 147.

C. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

In Israel, the political atmosphere is ruthless as politicians conduct vicious personal attacks and make outrageous ideological statements in order to sway public opinion. The prime minister and the ruling party have enormous power while the losing party has close to none. Military service is seen with high regard and the majority of influential government officials have previously held top ranks in the IDF. This explains the aggressive and militant nature of Israeli domestic and foreign policy. Israeli politics has always been dominated by ideological concerns and “the use of symbols, rhetoric, and coded phrases...is not likely to diminish soon.”¹⁴¹ National security is consistently given the highest priority and many discriminatory laws are introduced in the Knesset due to the perceived Arab threat to the Jewish nature of the state. While there is a long list of common hardships that Israeli Arabs must face each day, many of the events are slowly pushing them toward collective action. Tarrow describes political opportunity structure as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.”¹⁴² Important political and social events that have influenced the identity of the Stand-Tall generation are the 1999 election for Prime Minister, the political discussions of Arab land and population transfer, and the increasing anti-Arab sentiment among government officials.

The Prime Minister election of 1999 is still viewed with utter disgust by most Arab citizens of Israel. The circumstances and results of the election were covered earlier in this paper, but a discussion of the lasting repercussions is necessary. Starting with the Arab boycott of elections in 2001, the minority’s faith in the political process has continued to decrease. While some Arabs turned away from mainstream political parties like Likud and Labor and decided to support less powerful Arab parties like Balad, others have given up on politics completely. Before elections in March of 2006, Hanan Ihsaniya, a college student, voiced a common viewpoint among the Stand-Tall generation

¹⁴¹ Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel: The Second Republic* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 16.

¹⁴² Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85.

when she stated “we always vote, but we don’t see results.”¹⁴³ The democratic process will always produce a number of disgruntled people whose party lost the most recent election, but the Arab case in Israel is different. Even when the party they vote for wins, it does not always feel obligated to represent them. Many Arabs view the political process as a voice for only Jews and they are seeking change outside of the government. The “instability of political alignments” that is created when political parties fail to address their Arab constituency is an important aspect of opportunity structure.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, it has created an excellent opportunity for movement leaders as they seek to fill the gap left by the political process. Islamic groups that reject the democratic process like Hizb ut-Tahrir and the southern faction of the Islamic Movement have benefited from Israel’s consistent failure to accommodate its Arab population in the political arena.

Several aspects of the situation indicate that [violence] is possible. One is the electoral boycott of 2001, followed by the fall to 64 percent in Arab electoral participation in 2003, and 56 percent in 2006. This may indicate that a significant portion of the Arab population does not consider that democracy as it is implemented in Israel is a good way to advance their political program. Another aspect is the growing popularity of the radical wing of the Islamic Movement headed by Ra’id Salah. Finally, while terrorist violence remains a marginal phenomenon, it has gained more adherents among the [Israeli] Arabs than it ever had before.¹⁴⁵

It is true that the Islamic Movement and other religious groups do not find a captivated audience in all segments of the Israeli Arab population, but the Arab population will be more willing to open their minds to radical messages if the Israeli system continues to alienate them.

Land is a sensitive subject in Israel for Jews and Arabs since both groups use it as the foundation of their national identity. Palestinian Arabs believe they were unjustly forced off their land in 1948 and 1967. In contrast, Israeli Jews believe forcing the Arabs out of Israel was based on national security since Israel was at war against surrounding Arab countries. Both arguments place land at the heart of the issue. Likewise, land and

¹⁴³ Dina Kraft, “Politicians Court a Not-So-Silent Minority: Israeli Arabs,” *The New York Times* (March 21, 2006), A1.

¹⁴⁴ Tarrow, 87.

¹⁴⁵ Lauer, 203.

population transfer is a Jewish solution to the Arab demographic problem in Israel that has always been discussed by the government in private, but in recent years the controversial topic has entered the public realm. Population transfer implies the stripping of citizenship from Arab citizens of Israel and transferring them outside of Israel's borders. Land transfer refers to placing Israeli Arab land under the sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority in order to continue the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. "On posters and billboards, in taxi cabs and living rooms, and on radio and television, ethnic cleansing is advocated not only for suppressing Palestinian resistance in the Occupied Territories but also for neutralizing the calls of Palestinian citizens of Israel for equality. Even if mass deportations never occur, the discussion of transfer itself constitutes a weight on Israel's Palestinian citizens, reminding them at every turn that they are but temporary residents in their own land."¹⁴⁶ Before the resurgence of talks on transfer, the Israeli government was balancing the demography of Arab dominated areas by providing incentives for Jewish settlers to move into the region in question. However, international pressure on Israel to reduce its settlement activity has left the Jewish majority seeking other means to counter the demographic threat. Based on the discriminatory solutions that have been considered by the Knesset, the government is placing the Jewish description of the state above its democratic nature. While these measures could possibly give the Jewish majority a false sense of security, they strike fear in the hearts of the Arab minority which creates opportunity for movement organizers.

The most recent controversies surrounding land issues deal with illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank. According to international law, it is illegal for Israel to settle on land that was seized during war, in this case, the 1967 war. Even as U.S. President George Bush visited Israel in January 2008 and told the Israeli government to "get rid of unauthorized settlements," settlers were busy building more structures in the West Bank.¹⁴⁷ Israel has been reluctant to release the exact number of settlements for

¹⁴⁶ Robert Blecher, "Living on the Edge: The Threat of "Transfer" in Israel and Palestine," *Middle East Report*, no. 225 (Winter 2002), 23-24.

¹⁴⁷ Jonathan Finer, "West Bank's Jewish 'Outposts' Dig In; Many Answer Bush's Demand for End to Illegal Settlements by Starting New Construction," *The Washington Post* (January 13, 2008), A19.

fear of reprisals from the international community.¹⁴⁸ Settlers have claimed several parcels of land that are rightfully owned by Palestinians who have the documents to prove it. The court system may rule in the Palestinians' favor, but getting the government to force the settlers off the private land is another story. One such Palestinian named Badriya Amer was chased off her land by gun-wielding settlers and is waiting on the courts to rule in her favor. "I put my faith in God, not in courts, but I have no other option."¹⁴⁹ At this point, many Israeli Arabs like Amer have lost faith in the Israeli political system as well as the court system due to blatant anti-Arab bias. The government denies any kind of support to the non-government sponsored settlements and outposts, but "it has played a major role in planning, funding and encouraging some of them. Many draw power from the main Israeli grid and receive other public services, including water supply."¹⁵⁰

Aside from settlements and the discussion of transfer, political opportunities for Arab collective action present themselves every time an Israeli government official spouts off anti-Arab rhetoric through an official forum. Since the second intifada began in 2000, there has been an abundance of discriminatory propaganda spread by both elected and appointed government officials. When an Israeli Arab experiences discrimination on the street, he can downplay it as an isolated incident that will not affect his rights as an Israeli citizen. In contrast, the common use of blatant discriminatory and racist language by Jewish government officials makes the Arab minority feel deeply threatened. The following quotes by various government officials and important figures in Israeli society are evidence of the hostile atmosphere that Arabs face.

If you continue like this, you [Palestinians] will wind up with things much worse than the revocation of citizenship, you will wind up with mass expulsions. If you don't stop this way of yours, the Jewish majority will simply scatter you to the winds.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Ed O'Loughlin, "Israel hiding settlement facts to protect image," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, January 9, 2008, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/01/08/1199554655218.html>, (accessed on February 26, 2008).

¹⁴⁹ *Finer*, A20.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Blecher*, 29.

- MK Uri Ariel's response to an Arab MK's criticism of the Interior Minister for revoking the citizenship of Arab citizens accused of planning terrorist attacks (September, 2002)

The Arabs in Israel are a ticking time bomb...[T]hey resemble a cancerous growth. We shall have to consider the ability of the Israeli democracy to continue the Arabs' participation.¹⁵²

- Leader of the National Religious Party, MK Efraim Eitam (March, 2002)

In Israel, the Arabs do not exist. They are transparent. They are not seen. The very word 'Arab' has commonly been thought to be so offensive in Hebrew that newspapers often use the term 'minorities instead. The phrase 'Arab labor' is also pejorative. At first, it was thought impolite to employ an Arab instead of a Jew. But it changed. If you made a mistake or did something wrong in your labor, it became 'Arab work.' But this is just daily racism. The most important thing is the power relationship.¹⁵³

- Israeli poet, author, and Haaretz columnist Yitzhak Laor (2006)

What [Labor leader] Amir Peretz did this morning is to swing an enormous ax at the tree called Zionism. We need to drive out and destroy this evil from our environs. The State of Israel is a Jewish state that is supposed to be ruled by Jewish values, with a Jewish regime and Jewish sovereignty.¹⁵⁴

- MK Esterina Tartman's response to Labor's appointment of Israel's first-ever Arab cabinet minister (January 2007)

[A]ll the rights over the Land of Israel are Jewish rights. In the Land of Israel, all the rights must be given to the people who live here. That is the difference between rights over the Land and rights in the Land.¹⁵⁵

- Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's response when asked about inequality between Arabs and Jews by an Arab MK. (July 2002)

There is a huge gap between us [Jews] and our enemies not just in ability but in morality, culture, sanctity of life, and conscience. They are our neighbors here, but it seems as if at a distance of a few hundred meters

¹⁵² Oren Yiftachel, "The Shrinking Space of Citizenship: Ethnocratic Politics in Israel," *Middle East Report*, no. 223 (Summer 2002), 42.

¹⁵³ Allan C. Brownfeld, "Increased Pressure on Arab Citizens Tests Israel's Commitment to Genuine Democracy," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (December 2006), 29.

¹⁵⁴ "Arab Cabinet Pick Stirs 'Zionism-Racism' Debate; Rice, on Mideast Tour, Makes Time for Hardliner Lieberman," *The Forward* (January 19, 2007), A1.

¹⁵⁵ Nadim N. Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 33, no. 1 (Autumn 2003), 16.

away there are people who do not belong to our continent, to our world, but actually belong to a different galaxy.¹⁵⁶

- Israeli President Moshe Katzav (May 2001)

If you ask me, Israel's number one problem is not the Palestinian problem; it is first of all [the problem of] Arab citizens of the State of Israel...Do I Consider them citizens of the State of Israel? No!...They have to find a place where they will feel comfortable.¹⁵⁷

- MK Avigdor Lieberman (December 2001)

The above statements are suitable for a hated enemy of the state and not its own citizens. For Israel's Arab population, the line separating the two descriptions seems to fade a little more each day.

Political opportunities for Arab mobilization present themselves almost everyday in Israel but they become more difficult for movement leaders to exploit once the Arab minority grows desensitized to government sponsored discrimination. Radical comments by government officials like Lieberman and Eitam initially strike fear in the hearts of Arab citizens; however, the population eventually becomes desensitized to such rhetoric and thinks of it as politics as usual. "Pervasive, casual discrimination has become an accepted facet of daily life in Israel, no longer provoking outrage."¹⁵⁸ In order to describe the deadening of the senses to radical undertones in the Israeli government, Fred Lazin, the head of the government and politics department at Ben-Gurion University, said, "In the past, these people would be thought of as extremist. Now they aren't even asked to leave the government."¹⁵⁹ While Israeli Arabs may have learned to tune out the negative comments of government officials and society at large, a sense of hopelessness is evident in their ranks. Their citizenship, in many ways, has little meaning and they are reminded of it with every snide remark that emerges from the Jewish majority. The loss of dignity and self-respect that accompanies discrimination opens the door to groups who

¹⁵⁶ Nadim N. Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 33, no. 1 (Autumn 2003), 18.

¹⁵⁷ Rouhana and Sultany, 18.

¹⁵⁸ Blecher, 29.

¹⁵⁹ "Arab Cabinet Pick Stirs 'Zionism-Racism' Debate; Rice, on Mideast Tour, Makes Time for Hardliner Lieberman," *The Forward* (January 19, 2007), A2.

provide alternatives to the Israeli state apparatus. If Israel continues to create opportunities for mobilization by treating its Arab citizens as enemies of the state, then it will surely create a self-fulfilling prophecy.

V. CONCLUSION

Israel has been defending its borders from external threats since 1948 and the outlook for peace with its Arab neighbors remains bleak. The uncompromising stance that Israel takes with its own Arab citizens provides a glimpse into the difficulty of forging a peace treaty with the neighboring Arab states. If the Jewish majority refuses to trust its own Arab citizens, then there is little hope for Israel ever making a lasting peace with Palestinians and Arabs outside of its borders. The Jewish majority justifies sixty years of discrimination against its Arab minority through security concerns and primordial claims to the land. Israeli Arabs are not protesting because they are ideologically inclined to hate Jews, but because they are treated as enemies in their own state. Many Arab citizens are still bitter at the state for various historical grievances and their viewpoints would most likely moderate if they were treated as equals. Security and distrust of Arabs has become an ideological sticking point in the minds of the Jewish population and it cannot be overcome with the current policies that are in place. Unfortunately, Israel has created its own internal problem with its Arab citizens and the future looks grim when politicians are willing to discuss population transfer before the consideration of equal rights. Political change is unlikely because any government official is labeled as a traitor for showing favor to the Arab population within the Jewish state. Social mobilization is the only option that remains for the Arab citizens of Israel to gain equality among the Jewish majority. Even though it is the only remaining option, collective action is still a difficult concept. Israel's history of successful conventional wars against Arab states has engrained the ideal in Israeli society that "might makes right" and the willingness of the IDF to use lethal force against Arab citizens on several occasions shows that anything less than total and complete social mobilization is doomed to fail.

On the international stage, the dilemma faced by Israeli Arabs is completely overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The democratic government in Israel is an effective façade for the ethnocentric intentions of the state. Arab citizens can participate in elections and even serve in the Knesset, but their influence is minimized by

the Jewish majority. In theory, Arabs with legal disputes can take their cases to the Israeli court system and receive a fair trial. For example, there are several landmark rulings by the Israeli Supreme Court that have expanded land rights to Arab citizens and theoretically paved the way for equality between Jews and Arabs. These rulings are used by the Israeli government to show the world that all citizens in the Jewish state enjoy equal rights. In reality, the world does not see the Israeli government's failure to enforce the new rulings at the local level. One such example is a Supreme Court ruling in 2000 that stated all Israeli citizens, including Arabs, can live wherever they choose in Israel. Since the ruling, Jewish members of Knesset have made several attempts to circumvent the high court's decision.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the ruling was never enforced at the local level. The same pattern is evident in Israel's attitude toward illegal settlements in the occupied territories. The Israeli military has forced Jewish settlers off Palestinian land in the past, the most popular example was the clearing of Gaza in 2005, but attempts in recent years are half hearted or non-existent.¹⁶¹ So despite Israel's outward appearance of democracy, it still lacks many of the equal rights and opportunities that are common in such a government.

Arab collective action in Israel is dependent on the three main components of social movement theory. The second intifada failed because structures, frames and opportunities were not properly utilized simultaneously. The Palestinian leadership may have excelled in one aspect, but failed in another. Ariel Sharon created the opportunity for Arab mobilization by visiting Haram al-Sharif and numerous mobilizing structures were available to get the protesters out in the streets. As time went on and the anger over Sharon's actions was replaced with fear of IDF reprisals, there was a lack of effective frames to maintain the high level of Israeli Arab protest. Finding frames that resonate with all Palestinians, whether they are in Israel, the occupied territories, or the diaspora is a difficult challenge because the context of each group is different. Israeli Arabs would need the numerical strength of a unified social movement involving all three groups in order to achieve success. Each group needs to understand how it could potentially

¹⁶⁰ Hirsh Goodman, "Watch the 'A' Word," *The Jerusalem Report* (July 29, 2002), 9.

¹⁶¹ Finer, A18.

benefit from Israeli Arabs achieving equal rights in Israel. A method used by the Islamic movement on the local level is to exploit the lack of self-respect and pride that plagues Palestinians due to the Israeli occupation. Such a frame, if utilized by a mainstream movement, would resonate with the majority of Palestinians around the world. If movement organizers cannot develop the right symbols and slogans or adapt existing ones to the changing environment, then their cause will continually fail to resonate with the movement itself. The current Israeli blockade of Gaza has triggered several protests in the occupied territories, but the Arab population in Israel has yet to take an active role. If they miss this chance to gain support through protests that started in the occupied territories, there are sure to be many more opportunities in the future.

Some scholars have compared the situation of Israeli Arabs to apartheid in South Africa, a subject that is still sensitive to many people around the world. Zreik explains the powerful simplicity of the frames used by the anti-apartheid movement.

Their demands, clear-cut and neat, were articulated with concision and clarity. It was easy to grasp the symmetry that the struggle aimed to achieve, where all South Africans would share the same basic rights; the imagined symmetry itself conveyed the asymmetry of the apartheid situation. By the showing the whole, one can see what is missing – the absent rights of the black community became clear, concrete, framed, and (as such) visible.¹⁶²

For the most part, Arab and Jewish neighborhoods are separated from one another and state funding for various education and development programs is much higher in Jewish sectors. The new security wall that separates Israel from the occupied territories also resembles behavior from the apartheid era in South Africa. Frames that resonate within the Israeli Arab own population will have limited success on the international stage and the opposite is also true. When the world thinks of Palestinians, it immediately pictures Palestinians in the occupied territories along with all the frames that have been constructed by Palestinian nationalism. An independent Palestinian state is the main ideal that comes to mind and equal rights for Arab citizens of Israel are seldom considered. The mention of the term “Palestinians in Israel” will most likely garner a

¹⁶² Raef Zreik, “Palestine, Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34, no. 1 (Autumn 2004), 70.

similar response. In order for a frame to truly resonate, people need to understand and identify with it immediately without having to look up more information or it must peak their interest enough to make them want to become better informed. Using similar frames from the anti-apartheid movement has the potential to attract that kind of response.

As this paper has argued, discrimination is pushing Israel's Arab population away from the political arena and toward a tighter embrace of Palestinian nationalism and the frames that accompany it. Israeli Arab movement leaders can capitalize on existing frames by tailoring them to their own situation. The organizations capable of acting as mobilizing structures are numerous, but their strategies for change vary from one to another. The Islamic movement and Hizb ut-Tahrir strive for change through religious and social means while other groups promote politics or violence. Many organizations like Arab student unions and Palestinian Israeli NGOs are effective at providing information to their members and prepping them for protests. Unfortunately, the support seldom transitions to direct participation in sustained collective action. Historically, the majority of the Arab population has been content with playing the role of supporter rather than actor although the trend is slowly changing. Many mobilizing structures are limited to the facilitation of sideline support which means they provide a forum for grievances against the state and nothing more. In order to remain relevant in the Stand-Tall generation, many organizations will need to convince their members to take a more active role in gaining equal rights.

Recent events have shown that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will have direct results on the Arabs in Israel. Palestinian and Israeli demands were discussed at the Annapolis Conference in November 2007 and the most important topic was an independent Palestinian state. A Palestinian state would mark the culmination of a sixty year struggle for many Palestinians, but it would also prove disastrous for many Israeli Arabs. Such a state would provide the ideal location for Israel to forcefully relocate its Arab citizens at an opportune time when national security is supposedly at stake.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ Eetta Prince-Gibson, "Land (Swap) For Peace?" *The Jerusalem Report* (November 26, 2007), 43-44.

Based on the anti-Arab quotes that were mentioned in the previous chapter, the transfer of Israel's Arab population against their will could be a reality in the future. Discrimination would also increase against Israeli Arabs in order to pressure them into leaving Israel voluntarily. Additionally, a Palestinian state would make collective action more difficult to achieve among the Israeli Arab population since moving to the new state might prove more appealing than risking bodily harm in protests against Israel.

The Stand-Tall generation has the potential to achieve more for Israeli Arabs than any prior generation and the important factor is that many of them realize it. These highly educated and informed Arab citizens can revitalize many of the social movement organizations that have been stagnant for several years. They use their identities as Israeli citizens to acquire the knowledge necessary to mobilize through Palestinian nationalism. In other words, they embrace the benefits of their Israeli citizenship, but not the identity itself. Their heightened awareness increases the probability of seeking change outside of the ineffective political realm. Many in the Stand-Tall generation do not identify with their Israeli citizenship because, to them, it represents the Jewish nature of the state. The hopes of Israel's Arab citizens lie on the backs of these members of the new generation and their ability to create change beyond the local level. The members of the Stand-Tall generation that have embraced their Israeli identity are still an important component of collective action as well. Demographics are just as important for an Arab social movement as they are to the Jewish majority. Israeli Arabs could muster overwhelming amounts of outside support for an equal rights movement but it would be a major setback if the majority of their educated elites were not mobilized. The Palestinian people on both sides of the green line have dealt with so much repression since 1948 that their capacity for suffering makes it difficult to determine a definite tipping point for collective action. Historic trends show that Israel will continue to rely on costly measures to maintain the status quo, so it is up to the Israeli Arabs within the emerging Stand-Tall generation to demonstrate that they are willing to pay a higher cost to change it.

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